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I. INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century has begun with the most dramatic terrorist
attacks in the history of the world. The United States can no longer isolate
itself from the world and maintain the security necessary to protect its peo-
ple, its enterprises, and the Constitution that governs them. The United
States must instead be an active leader committed to dialogue with other
countries about individual liberty and national responsibility. This dialogue
must include discussion about the merits and capabilities of the International
Criminal Court, and the weaknesses of its governing statute. A good discus-
sion should start at home, with conversation about the United States' crimi-
nal system in the context of international relations, and then expand to par-
ties around the world ready to join in the discussion.
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") began its operations in 2003
after years of preparation and many more years of need for such an institution.
This Article discusses the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC Statute") written to direct the prosecution of future war criminals at this
institution. The primary objective of this Article is to discuss minimal guaran-
tees necessary to secure a legitimate ICC. Moreover, this Article is organized
for an audience made up of American practitioners who have an interest in for-
eign relations and international law but do not have a significant international
component in their practice.' It is also written to address issues raised by spe-
Many commentators have written about the ICC, but most of these articles are in specialized
journals published primarily for a limited community of international scholars. See, e.g., Joel F.
England, The Response of the United States to the International Criminal Court: Rejection, Ratifi-
cation or Something Else?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 941 (2001); Monroe Leigh, The United
States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 124 (2001); Cara Levy Rodriguez, Slaying the
Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
805 (1999). There is a lack of materials that presents both strong legal arguments about the tribu-
nal's flaws and supports its underlying necessity. This Article attempts to fill this gap by address-
ing these issues and appealing to a wider audience of American practitioners. For a wider discus-
sion of the gap between international law and legal education in the United States, see Charlotte
Ku & Christopher J. Borgen, American Lawyers and International Competence, 18 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 493 (2000).
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cialists in the field of international criminal law. This Article is based on the
premise that a fair and effective ICC will help to ensure that war criminals are
held accountable for their actions2 and that such a tribunal has the capability to
be an important check on the use of power. However, as the law promulgating
the ICC currently is written, the ICC does not provide a structure obligatory for
the basis of any institution of such great prestige, strength and necessity. The
statute that created the court does not meet basic legal expectations held by
practitioners in the courts of the United States. Most notably, the due process
standards under the statute are deficient because of their ambiguities and omis-
sions, and the statute permits raw political manipulation of legal issues. This
article is meant to encourage discussion of these problems within broader seg-
ments of the United States bar.
The United States is not currently a part of the ICC and cannot join it
until these flaws are addressed. Although it is in the best interest of the United
States and the rest of the world to create a permanent international war crimes
tribunal, the current tribunal will not be legitimate or effective without some
basic reforms. This Article is a discussion of various flaws in the statute, flaws
in the process by which the statute was drafted, and of recommended revisions
to address these flaws.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of what the ICC is and the
framework provided for it within the body of international criminal law. This
part includes a discussion of the limited precedent that exists in world history
for this tribunal, the relationship between domestic sovereignty and international
institutions, differing views of the court from different parts of the world, and an
explanation of how a properly drafted statute could benefit the United States.
Part III discusses the need for reform. It provides an overview of the ICC Stat-
ute's flaws and discusses their significance. Specifically, this section focuses on
the two most prominent deficiencies: the role of political influences and the
lack of due process guarantees. Part IV discusses the need for express guaran-
tees of the rights of individuals brought before the ICC for prosecution and for
2 It is possible to have a private cause of action against war criminals. See Christopher Mun-
nion, Tribe Sues Germany for Colonial Genocide: We Want Justice for 1904 Campaign, Say
Hereo People, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 31, 2003, at 17 (discussing a suit filed by repre-
sentatives of the Hereros, a native tribe from Namibia, against a German bank for alleged assis-
tance in attempted genocide that took place between 1904 and 1907), available at 2003 WL
12076658. However, this Article will only address public mechanisms for the accountability of
war criminals.
3 This Article agrees with the American Bar Association's recommendations that there should
be a fair and effective international criminal court created by multilateral treaty and that the
United States should continue an active role in negotiating an international criminal court, but
disagrees with wording in the Association's recommendation that rights afforded to accused per-
sons and defendants merely meet "internationally recognized standards of fairness and due proc-
ess," in light of the deficiencies in the statute discussed below. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON AN INT'L
CRIMINAL COURT, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N JOINT REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1993), reprinted in 27
INT'L LAW. 257, 268 (1993).
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express limitations on the power of the justices of the tribunal. Part V places
some of these flaws in context by discussing the problematic drafting process
and the incohesive conditions under which the statute was designed. The final
section contains a prospective glance at potential prosecutions in the court and
conclusions regarding the necessity for the United States and its allies to pro-
ceed towards a more universal court that is more stable and less prone to abuse.
II. BACKGROUND
A. International Criminal Law: The Stage that Supports the International
Criminal Court
This discussion must be placed in the context of the application of inter-
national criminal law.4 There are many great works of religious scholarship
about the regulation of war,5 but, unlike most areas of the law, there is no broad
tradition of secular legal interpretation.6 International criminal law has existed
almost entirely in theory for centuries.7 In international relations, rarely does
authority exist, other than through the use of force or political manipulation,
particularly in regions where there is a weak domestic legal system. It should
therefore be of no surprise that this is among the least developed areas of the
4 International criminal law is a body of law that provides criminal responsibility for grave
breaches of international law. It is a cousin to international human rights law, which centers on
protecting human dignity of the individual. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREM-
BERG LEGACY 9 (1997).
5 All major religious traditions have laws of just wars. See, e.g., SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY
OF GOD (J.W.C. Wand, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1963); JOHN KELSAY, ISLAM AND WAR: A
STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS (1993); Michael Walzer, War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition,
in THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES 95 (Terry Nardin ed.,
1998).
6 War criminals have historically been prosecuted since at least the time of the Ancient
Greeks, and in isolated prosecutions in Europe. See Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reac-
tion to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 681, 684-86 (1997). Examples include the 1268 trial in Naples of Conradin von Hohensta-
fen, for initiating an unjust war and the 1474 trial of Peter von Hagenbach, governor of territories
in what is now western Germany, for murder, rape, pillage and other crimes violating the "law of
God and man." Id. at 689-93. Individuals in the United States have been prosecuted for slaugh-
tering Native Americans. See Captain Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and
Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 116 n.60 (1972). However, there were very few war
crimes trials documented until the twentieth century. For an overview of some early international
criminal prosecutions, see I GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 462-66 (3d ed.
1957).
7 But see FRANCIS LIEBER, U.S. WAR DEP'T., INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ARMIES OF THE U.S. IN THE FIELD, GENERAL ORDERS No. 100 (1863) (codifying laws of war;
drafted at order of President Lincoln and commonly referred to as Lieber Code), reprinted in
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCUSSIONS, 1903: THE UNITED STATES NAVAL
WAR CODE OF 1900, at 115 (1904).
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law. For these reasons, a meaningful discussion of the ICC Statute must be
placed in the context of basic legal precedent that exists, the environment in
which the law will be enforced, and the relations amongst the parties affected by
the law.
Recent history, particularly in the wake of the Cold War, has brought a
complete end to colonialism and shows strengthened ties of global economic
interdependence that mandate peaceful relations and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms worldwide. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the worldwide order
imposed by the political realities of the Cold War, numerous sovereigns, free of
the international alliances of the Cold War, have readily adapted to a different
paradigm for the management of international relations. Between 1989 and
1999, almost a dozen international judicial institutions became active or were
extensively reformed, compared to only about six or seven prior international
judicial bodies.8 Countries worldwide have sought stable institutions that act
under the rule of law and voluntarily have accepted broad international legal
structures that cut deeply into their domestic sovereignties. 9 The enforcement of
basic human rights violations has moved from nonbinding expectations of sov-
ereign nations without enforcement mechanisms and rare ad hoc war crime tri-
bunals to complex doctrines designed to supercede and modify the very bases of
domestic legal systems.'
0
Any effective foundation for a legal standard governing international
conduct must be drafted and implemented in a realistic way to prevent its irrele-
vance. Until the end of the Cold War, legalism was regularly estranged from
major events in international relations and provided little insight towards the
resolution of international crises." Since the Cold War, in the American acad-
8 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the
Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 711-23 (1999) (discussing the definition of "interna-
tional judicial body" in the context of an overview of the post-Cold War state of the development
of international judicial bodies).
9 See Effective Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights
Instruments, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness of the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 15, at 11 14-36, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/74 (1997) (lauding progression towards worldwide agreement to enforceable human
rights treaties).
10 See Laurence R. Heifer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 288-
96 (1999) (presenting a historical overview of the development of international petition system for
alleged human rights violations).
I The fall of the Iron Curtain has brought an attempt at legalism never seen before in past
milestones in Western history, such as the emergence of multi-polar world politics in wake of
Napoleonic defeat at the Peace of Vienna in 1815, the failed peace in wake of German defeat at
the Peace of Versailles in 1919 and the emergence of bipolar world politics in wake of war in
Europe in the Yalta Conference in 1945. See David J. Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and
Empiricism in International Law: Legal Rules and International Society, 89 GEo. L.J. 469, 470
(2001) (reviewing ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999)
and discussing its attempts to place the state's role in international affairs within the conceptual
framework that there is a rule of law for international relations).
2004]
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emy there has been an unprecedented intersection of the rule-based idealism of
international law and the methodological realism of international policy. 2 This
injection of relevancy and accountability into international law has led to ambi-
tious agendas outside of the academy, unthinkable less than a generation ago.'
3
The potential for the implementation of a system of positivist legal sta-
bility amongst the world's sovereigns is comparable to the use of law to stabi-
lize the western United States during its early development. The West evolved
from being a region characterized by assault, murder, and ethnic cleansing to a
safe and stable region that is a primary component to the peaceful leadership
position held by the United States in the world today. This transformation was
accomplished by drawing together a system of law and upholding it with strong
due process guarantees.14 With respect for a rule of law that includes strong due
process guarantees, a structural vacuum of lawlessness can be filled. This in-
cludes the power of politics in contemporary international relations. It nonethe-
less remains difficult to picture a broad legal system for basic war crimes having
any legitimacy over the world's diverse thought paradigms, communication
styles, and cultural expectations. 5 While the ICC Statute is not the Magna
12 Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New
Generation ofInterdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 367 (1998) (discussing inter-
disciplinary literature at the convergence of the study of the international law and the study of
international relations, and the relationships between international structures and the processes
which govern them).
13 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, A Post-Cold War Human Rights Agenda, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 249
(1994) (discussing ambitious post-Cold War international human rights agenda with basis in in-
ternational law).
14 Compare C.L. SONNICHSEN, THE EL PASO SALT WAR, 1877 (reprint ed. 1973) (chronicling
race war that killed approximately ten percent of the population of El Paso, Texas, after which no
one was tried for any of the crimes that took place during the fighting), and CHARLES M.
ROBINSON III, THE MEN WHO WEAR THE STAR: THE STORY OF THE TEXAS RANGERS (2000) (re-
viewing both the heroism and the abuse of power by authorities who were establishing the basis
for a legal system amongst the chaos of South Texas in the nineteenth century), with Andrew
Walker, Mexican Law and the Texas Courts, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 225 (2003) (tracing history of
jurisprudence in Texas, from chaos of the nineteenth century to its current status as a very stable
guarantor of individual rights, through the fusion of law that is foreign to the eastern United States
and the law that was the basis of the legal system in the East), and Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering
the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27 N.M. L. REV. 273 (1997) (tracing history of
interpretation of United States Constitution through application of federal Indian law). Despite
the gains that may be held out as a model for the world, it cannot be stressed strongly enough that
the United States has considerable challenges remaining to create an equitable system of law in
the wake of its westward expansion. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property
Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 218 (1996)
(drawing together histories of treaties made to protect Native Americans and Mexican Americans
as the basis for fuller implementation of treaty guarantees).
15 See GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 99 (195 1) (discussing tradi-
tional argument that any attempt to regulate international relations through the application of law
ignores the "significance of political problems and the deeper sources of international instability").
[Vol. 106
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Carta, it is an initial step towards real limits on the most serious abuses of power
by lawless authorities. All legal systems must start at some point.
1 6
B. What is the International Criminal Court?
The ICC is a permanent institution that is intended to have power to ex-
ercise jurisdiction complementary to national criminal jurisdictions for the most
serious crimes of international concern, as set out in the statute promulgating the
court. 17 The ICC is governed by the provisions in its enacting statute, customary
international law,' 8 and the principles and guidelines developed by the various
treaties that make up the loose structure of international criminal law. The ICC
Statute outlines the scope of the court's mandate and is divided into thirteen
primary parts. 19 The court has a trial division, an appellate division, and a pre-
trial division; each division with its own judges.20 It currently claims jurisdic-
tion over the offense of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.21
C. Sovereignty and the Development of the International Criminal Court
During the early twentieth century, the Permanent Court of International
Justice22 stated in dictum, "International law governs relations between inde-
pendent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted
as expressing principles of law. 2 3 Implicit in this statement is the concept that
international law is based upon the respect for state sovereignty. The concept of
sovereignty has been the legitimizing force for all theories of international law
16 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961) (presenting the United States as being a republic of unprecedented size bound together in
the libertarian ideals of its Constitution).
17 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 1, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
32/A/Conf.183/9 (1998) (entered into force as corrected July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC STATUTE],
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome-statute(e).pdf.
18 See id. art. 22.
19 Sections of the statute include: (I) Establishment of the Court; (2) Jurisdiction, Admissibil-
ity and Applicable Law; (3) General Principles of Criminal Law; (4) Composition and Admini-
stration of the Court; (5) Investigation and Prosecution; (6) The Trial; (7) Penalties; (8) Appeal
and Revision; (9) International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, (10) Enforcement; (11) As-
sembly of States Parties; (12) Financing; and (13) Final Clauses. See generally id.
20 Id. arts. 34(b), 39.
21 Id. art. 5, § l(a)-(d).
22 The Permanent Court of International Justice was created by the League of Nations for the
peaceful resolution of international disputes and is the basis on which the United Nations created
the International Court of Justice. For an historic overview of early international courts, see Fred
L. Morrison, The Future of International Adjudication, 75 MINN. L. REV. 827, 828-33 (1991).
23 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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since the Peace of Westphalia attempted to end the European tradition of inter-
ference in other states' affairs.24 However, even during the seventeenth century,
there was a Hobbsian need for alliances to restrain foreign hostilities. The
strengthened ties and interdependence that grew with technological advances in
communication and transportation of the twentieth century has led to a greater
need in the twenty-first century for alliances and for non-state organizations that
infringe on the traditional concepts of relations amongst states.
The most basic limitations on state sovereignty since the creation of the
United Nations are the principles of international law recognized by the Charter
and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.25 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal placed limits on the traditional concept of sovereignty when it determined
that basic international legal standards included crimes against humanity, such
as the prohibition against the extermination of a civilian population, and then
applied this law under the theory of universal jurisdiction.26 Before World War
II, state sovereignty was accepted as a barrier to outside prevention of such
crimes, 27 and as the basis for colonial efforts to abuse and extinguish native.peoples.28 Since World War II it has been generally accepted by the United
24 See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9,
15-17 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (discussing basic concepts of international law that emerged in Europe
during the era after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648). See generally ANDREW LINKLATER, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-WESTPHALIAN
ERA (1999).
25 See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946).
26 The Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or perse-
cutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connec-
tion with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat.
1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288, reprinted in I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10, 11 (1947); see F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial
and the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 783 (1947) (noting controversial
conclusion of the Nuremberg Trial that aggressive war is not only illegal in international law but
also that individuals as well as states may be prosecuted); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,
PAMPHLET No. 27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-34 (1962) (Far Eastern Counterpart of the
Nuremberg Tribunal based on Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 jointly issued by China, the
United Kingdom, the United States and subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union).
27 See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 4-20
(2002) (discussing state sovereignty shielding individuals in the government of Turkey from being
held accountable for the mass murder of approximately one million Armenian people, and other
systematic abuses of this population during World War I).
28 See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR,
AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998) (discussing a carefully documented review of a geno-
[Vol. 106
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States, and around the world, that basic standards of civility in which a sover-
eign state respects the human rights of individual people fall under the rule of
international law.29 These limitations have been reinforced by the creation of
the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 30 and
Rwanda.3I
Even at the beginning of the Cold War, there was discussion of an inter-
national criminal court.32 Early in the Cold War, the United Nations drafted
rules for war crimes trials for the Korean conflict,33 but there were no trials fol-
lowing the conflict because the prisoners held by the United Nations Command
were repatriated.34 Like the Korean conflict, there is very little development of
the law that came from the American intervention in Vietnam.35 From a global
perspective, the largest failings of the international community came after the
genocides in Cambodia,36 Uganda,37 Bangladesh,38 and the demise of Bangla-
cide, much larger than that committed against the Jewish people in World War II, committed by
nineteenth-century Belgian colonists in the Congo).
29 See Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1987).
30 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
(resolution establishing International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
31 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(resolution establishing International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). The story of Rwanda is still
largely obscure. It is truly amazing that there is any rule of law in Rwanda after its mind-boggling
national pogrom of mechanized but manual, physical dismemberment of ten percent of its popula-
tion. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda 's
Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 561-64 (1998) (discussing "hard
work" by thousands of machete-wielding killers, killing approximately one million people, by
hand, in a one hundred day period; of the captured, only those who could afford to pay their killers
to be shot escaped the machetes).
32 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277; Report of the 1954 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Int'l
L. Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954); Report of the Com-
mittee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess.,
Supp. No. 1I, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952); see also Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an International
Criminal Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 37 (1950) (article by distinguished Romanian scholar at the
pinnacle of his career with insight of a life dedicated to principles of international criminal ac-
countability and concepts of international justice, well before they were more widely accepted).
33 See U.N. Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of the
United Nations Command, Korea.
_ JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 638 (2d ed.
2000).
35 But see United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534 (1973) (discussing prosecution relating to
the My Lai massacre).
36 See generally BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN
CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 (2002). The Pol Pot Regime committed a mas-
sive amount and wide variety of crimes against humanity. See Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of
the Last Great International Institution of the Twentieth Century: The International Criminal
20041
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desh International Crimes Tribunals due to raw political pressure at the peak of
the Cold War.39
D. Acceptance of an International Criminal Court in the United States and
Abroad
In light of the failings in Cambodia, Uganda, Bangladesh, and else-
where, a permanent and independent ICC is important because international
politics do not always permit a legal analysis of crimes against humanity. The
ICC has the potential to place the voice of reason outside of the roar of politics.
But reason, as the basis of law or in any social interaction, is but an amoral ser-
vant of private interests.40 It is due to this reality that most war criminals act
without being held responsible, and that international criminal law has rarely
stood for more than weakly persuasive authority. The ICC is important because
it offers the possibility of a stable and legal alternative to the traditional use of
Machiavellian politics and brute force as the guide to international relations,4'
and because it offers a forum for the use of reason to hold war criminals ac-
countable for their acts.
The idealism of the importance of the ICC is most easily accepted from
the perspective of European countries. Upon its military pacification, Europe's
traditional concepts of international relations were rejected. Europe has the
Court's Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 351 (2002). However, under the defini-
tion of genocide accepted in the world, murder on the basis of political identification or level of
education does. not enhance simple murder to genocide, even if it is mass murder. See Alexander
K.A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2288-94 (1999) (calling for definition of genocide based on effects of
act, rather than intent of act). For genocide to exist, murder must be conducted on the basis of
religious, ethnic, racial or national identification, but not political or educational identification.
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 32, art.
2; ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 6; see also Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're
Not Going to Get Away With It, I I MICH. J. INT'L L. 90, 94-95 (1989) (discussing the intersection
of politics and the definition of genocide).
37 See SIR PETER ALLEN, INTERESTING TIMES: UGANDA DIARIES, 1955-1986 (2000) (autobiog-
raphy of Ugandan judge trying to curb government sanctioned murder and lawlessness during rule
of Idi Amin).
38 See JAHANARA IMAM, OF BLOOD AND FIRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BANGLADESH'S WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE (Mustafizur Rahman trans., 1989) (chronicling of the slaughter, torture and rape of
millions of people during Bangladesh's war for independence from Pakistan).
39 See Jordan J. Paust & Albert Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The
Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1978).
40 See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, at xiv-xv (1934) (discussing
the limitations of human reason to solve social injustice by moral and rational means in the con-
text of Christian theologian's response to the existence of evil).
41 See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (N.H. Thomson trans., Dover Publ'ns 1992)
(1513) (prescription for realist paradigm as basis for policy).
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unique historical experience of having moved from a world of Hobbsian
strength and through self-destruction, to a rejection of the concept of balanced
powers imbedded in the Peace of Westphalia. Europe's Cold War geopolitical
placement allowed it to develop a rule-based political culture not possible in
parts of the world more susceptible to outside influences. Europe resists unilat-
eralism because its rejection of militarism has thus far been successful and be-
cause this rejection has left it with little capacity to act. 42 For Europe, interna-
tional law is not idealism; it is pragmatic policy that has little coSt. 4 3 Outside of
the political constraints of the Cold War, there is a strong European confidence
that international law has application in areas where there has been no military
pacification of international power politics.
In other parts of the world, such as in Latin American countries, the ICC
represents a check against foreign intervention. Across the developing world,
participation in the ICC represents the possibilities of having a voice in interna-
tional affairs and more peaceful regional development. In many countries, such
as Chili and Fiji, the ICC represents added security as a check against non-
democratic forces. 44 In some nations, participation is simply a statement of as-
pirational goals for their domestic legal system, respect for the rule of law, or of
commitment to the underlying ideals of the court.45 For extremely repressive
countries, such as Cuba, the act of simply signing the treaty that creates the ICC
could be an attempt to appear more peaceful and law abiding, an attempt to
make itself less isolated from the free world, or simply pure politics.
Around the world, many countries could resist the creation of the court
for several justifications. Countries such as Mexico or Columbia, that have ac-
tive rebel forces, may want to resist joining the ICC out of concern that its gov-
ernance could allow prosecution upon the recognized government for its treat-
ment of the forces seeking to overthrow it. In addition, Israel has a unique his-
tory, a lack of trust in the world community, and a geopolitical position that
shows how an after-the-fact prosecution does not necessarily bring peace or
security. Other Middle Eastern states may be reluctant to accept the court be-
cause they question some international human rights principles.46 Outside of
42 See Robert Kagen, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REV. No. 113., June & July 2002, at
http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02kagan.html.
43 Id.
44 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 228 (2000) (discussing the desire of some democracies to
use international commitments as a check on non-democratic forces in their own countries).
45 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, I I I YALE L.J.
1935, 2005-06 (2002) (concluding that some countries sign international agreements to express
commitment to the underlying ideals of the treaties).
46 See generally KEVIN DWYER, ARAB VoicEs: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (1991) (anthropologist's study of relationship between human rights principles and broader
cultural aspects of life in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia).
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Europe and the Americas, many cultures have historically not always placed
individual rights above other cultural traditions and communal needs.47
The existence of a strong ICC is in the United States' best interest. On a
primary basis, while the United States cannot rely on most states to carry out
their international obligations and must be able to protect itself from interna-
tional outlaws, it cannot be required to take on all of the world's burdens. An
effective international criminal court is capable of alleviating this burden by
maintaining security abroad where the United States cannot or should not act.
Ideally, it can force the elites of a country to respect the severity of the conse-
quences to be imposed by political risks of international criminal acts. Further-
more, it can compel national leaders to recognize the need for an international
system of multilateral accountability to replace the former bipolar political
status of the Cold War. This deterrence capability remains even if it is unrealis-
tic to expect an institution based on the Kantian ideal of interdependence
amongst sovereigns48 to serve as a reliable prophylactic to crimes against hu-
manity.
49
On a secondary basis, since the end of the Cold War, the United States
can attack virtually with impunity. For example, the United States has recently
overthrown Iraq, a large country six thousand miles away that showed only con-
tempt for international law. The United States accomplished this with limited
international support, in a short amount of time, and with relatively little nega-
tive effect on its economy or military capabilities. Despite the legal arguments
in support of military action in this situation 50 and the need to deter Iraqi aggres-
sion with both force and legalism, this display of the capabilities of American
power is contrary to the basis of reciprocal self-interest that underlies interna-
tional peace.
The War in Iraq exposes a power gap between the United States and
most of the world. This power gap, when coupled with a perceived lack of self-
interest the United States has in maintaining a peaceful world, encourages fear
47 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (discussing clash of Western values with the traditions and economic
needs of the non-Western world).
48 See generally Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS I I, 119 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (discussing
belief that human nature will eventually force the creation of a peaceful global community).
49 See generally Alfred P. Rubin, A Critical View of the Proposed International Criminal
Court, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1999, at 139 (arguing that the ICC's concentration on the
use of a binding positive law to provide a tribunal to enforce basic morals makes it impossible to
fulfill its purpose); Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of
Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156, 157 (2001) (arguing that application of international law will
not deter criminal state-actors at the international level as well as military force). A combination
of the legal and military solutions may be the best alternative.
I0 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law
Use of Force and Arms Control: Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 419,
427-28 (2003).
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and distrust of American power, even when there are very compelling reasons
for the United States to exercise its power. This fear and distrust underlies the
reason why many educated and freedom-loving peoples take exception to the
role that the United States has earned in the world. Therefore, if the ICC served
as a mechanism to enforce the basic norms of international law, there would be
less fear and distrust, and more international cooperation.
The world today has few mechanisms of any strength for enforcing the
norms of international humanitarian law other than simple moral suasion and
raw force. International regulatory agreements have traditionally not been nec-
essary to keep non-rogue states in line with international expectations.5 How-
ever, any state, if there exists no more than moral norms, may more easily set
aside such expectations in the name of political or military necessity or effi-
ciency.52 This is especially true in light of the United States' ability to make
massive military strikes from a distance and this country's political tectonics:
introverted, but positioned at the epicenter of the global order of our era. The
United States therefore has an interest in showing that it respects the rule of law
by taking the lead in the creation of a mechanism that enforces basic moral con-
duct on the world stage and that is not plagued by flaws in basic procedure.
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Significance of the Flaws in the ICC Statute
If the ICC does not fall into oblivion, it will necessarily claim the privi-
lege of a wide jurisdiction. This broad jurisdiction extends over crimes under
customary international law,53 beyond the United States Constitution,54 and, in
51 But see George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 384 (1996) (self interest in noncompliance with treaties).
52 This is a primary reason why international law exists beyond basic punishment of evil.
During the Cold War, when the United States faced brute totalitarian force of unprecedented mag-
nitude, a responsible check on American policies may have prevented results that are not congru-
ent with international (or American) expectations, such as the organized mass killings of civilian
populations by a Guatemalan government supported by the United States. While it may not have
been politically realistic to seek such a design during the Cold War without hindering victory, it is
currently more realistic to seek an international watchdog during the War on Terrorism because
the nature of the enemy is a philosophy that does not have power over any sovereign state. For a
review of the status of possible war crimes prosecutions in Guatemala, see Nathanael Heasley et
al., Impunity in Guatemala: The State's Failure to Provide Justice in the Massacre Cases, 16 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 115 (2001).
53 Customary international law is a limited body of law defined by the expectations of all
human beings as set out by their interactions over long periods of time. See generally Jordan J.
Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States,
12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1990) [hereinafter Paust, Customary International Law]. It is the weak-
est form of international law and does not always control the outcome of a case. See, e.g., Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1447-48 (11th Cir. 1986) (no due process right recognized under
customary international law for unadmitted aliens seeking parole revocation hearings). It has long
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some circumstances, over United States citizens regardless of whether the
United States agreed to the treaty that created the statute.55 Universal jurisdic-
tion exists only for a limited number of crimes that are of a nature of such seri-
ousness that any state should be able to prosecute the perpetrator without regard
to where the crime took place or where the perpetrator is located.56 As a result,
universal jurisdiction exists only for offenses that include genocide and crimes
against humanity. 57 Such jurisdiction may be exerted unless the treaty that pro-
vides statutory authority for a court precludes a country from rendering specific
groupings of individuals to the court.58 This assertion of jurisdiction was most
famously applied at Nuremberg over German citizens, regardless of the fact that
Germany was not a party to the treaty creating the Nuremberg Tribunal. The
ICC Statute similarly has no such limitation. An aggressive ICC Prosecutor
could assert this jurisdiction over citizens of the United States, regardless of the
potential innocence of the Americans accused and despite significant flaws in
the ICC Statute.
been a part of American law. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[I]nternational
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appro-
priate jurisdiction."); see also, e.g., The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871); The Brig
Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
51 (1833); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.)
199, 227 (1796); Houston v. Adm'r of Robertson, 2 Tex. 1 (1847) (discussing certain property
rights in Texas under international law); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50 (K.B. 1767) (in-
ternational law as part of common law United States inherited from England). For a discussion of
its potential for misuse at the ICC, see infra note 61.
'A There is no right of appeal from an international criminal trial to the courts of the United
States. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam) (discussing an attempted
habeas corpus from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East).
55 See generally Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals,
33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2000) (discussing the reach of the jurisdiction of the ICC and the
implications of this jurisdiction for the United States).
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987); Judgment of International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Oct. i, 1946), reprinted in I
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra
note 26, at 171, 223 (an individual "cannot claim immunity while acting in pursuance of the au-
thority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under intema-
tional law"). See generally Paust, supra note 55 (discussing the reach of the jurisdiction of the
ICC and the implications of this jurisdiction for the United States).
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
& cmt. a (defining the jurisdiction of States to punish certain offenses, including genocide).
58 This was done after World War II in Nuremberg and Tokyo and during the 1990s in the
tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but not in the tribunal for Rwanda, where the Rwandan gov-
ernment sanctioned the proceedings. See Paust, supra note 55, at 5.
[Vol. 106
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss2/4
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
B. Overview of the Flaws in the ICC Statute
In light of the monumental importance of the ICC and the authority that
exists for it to exercise a wide jurisdiction, the court is not acceptable in its cur-
rent status. The key to international compliance to a treaty is the fairness of
international rules themselves, 59 and a primary reason why sovereigns obey the
dictates of international bodies is the legitimacy of the processes by which such
bodies distribute justice.60 International law, however, outside of a theoretical
vacuum, can easily be used as a device to serve as no more than "a basis for a
rhetoric of recrimination.' Any international institution that is not perceived
as a fair administrator of substantive justice will fail to meet its goals.62 The
ICC Statute, as it is currently written, creates substantial risks of unfair trial pro-
ceedings and politically motivated prosecutions.
Instead of standing by as the ICC deteriorates into complete irrelevance,
nations with strong legal systems must lead the process to reform the statute.
The parties to this process must be willing to substantially rewrite the statute,
but the process itself should begin with an overview of some basic flaws. The
ICC Statute allows the court to undermine the settled system of international
governance and the United States' position in that system by infringing on the
role of the United Nations Security Council ("U.N. Security Council"). The
ICC Statute also allows the ICC Prosecutor to be chosen through an overly po-
litical procedure. The statute has unclear due process guarantees; it defines its
own jurisdictional limits and asserts a jurisdiction above that of all nations'
laws, including countries that have not agreed to be within the court's jurisdic-
tion.
These flaws, when viewed from a broader perspective, show a statute
that does not reconcile individual culpability and accountability, or individual
rights, with the wider interactions of states, and their individual legal systems.
If the world community is going to develop a more effective system for the im-
plementation of a system of basic accountability out of the "patchwork ' 63 of
international criminal law, it must recognize the limitations of the dichotomy
between individuals and states.64 Any international legal system that does not
59 See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995) (fairness in international governance).
60 Id.
61 Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law", NAT'L INT., Winter 1989/1990, at 3, 10.
62 See generally FRANCK, supra note 59 (fairness in international governance).
63 See Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407,
410 (2001) (describing fusion of statutory law, international treaties, customary law, and case law
as a "complex patchwork composed of different pieces").
64 See Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenia of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J.
237, 250-56 (1998) (discussing the necessity of filling in the gaps between the spheres of the state
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do so will fail. For this reason, most countries do not assent to international
agreements unless it is their intent to meet the agreement's standards in their
65domestic proceedings. By the same token, a country should not agree to an
international accord that requires the opposite: that it accept unreasonably lower
standards in order to abide by the accord.
In order for the rule of law in world affairs to have any integrity, the
most despicable war criminals must have a fair trial and the court of law must be
free from political influences. The right to a fair trial has long been accepted as
a basic human right.66 Nonetheless, a lead drafter of the ICC Statute has ignored
glaring due process concerns in the statute, stating that procedural law is not of
primary importance because "international human rights norms and standards on
fairness have reached such a level that developing a common denominator of a
sufficiently high standard to satisfy the requirements of most countries of the
world is quite possible. 67 However, this ideal has yet to occur at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), which has al-
lowed extremely sloppy trial procedures.68 In one trial, Dusko Tadi6, a Bosnian
Serb, was convicted of eleven crimes. 69 Absurdly enough, the tribunal included
among these convictions a crime that was never even charged in the indict-
ment.70 As a result, the accused had no opportunity to even prepare a defense to
this charge.71 The tribunal also allowed anonymous witnesses to testify to pri-
mary parts of the prosecution's case 72 and did not provide adequate discovery oradequate security for defense witnesses.73
and the individual in order to have greater accountability for human rights atrocities and the au-
thor's prescription for how to do so).
65 See Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and Domestic
Change: Conclusions, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE 234, 250 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
66 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 9-11, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
67 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesly, The Need for an International Criminal
Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT' L L. 151, 174 (1992).
68 See Prosecutor v. Tadi, 35 I.L.M. 32 (ICTY App. Chamber 1996).
69 For a detailed discussion of the Tadi6 case, see Aaron K. Baltes, Case Note, Prosecutor v.
Tadi6: Legitimizing the Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 49 ME. L. REV. 577, 590 (1997).
70 Id.
71 See Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statu-
tory Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 535,
558-70 (1999).
72 See id. at 558-70 (discussing the use of anonymous witnesses in the Tadie case); see also
Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 235, 235-36 (1996).
73 Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunals: Chal-
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As discussed in detail below, the ICC Statute permits the same and
similar violations to those allowed at the ICTY. It is not reasonable to expect
the United States to extradite its people to the jurisdiction of the ICC, where due
process of law is not suitably guaranteed and where there is susceptibility to
abuse and ineffectiveness. The ICC is a global tribunal with a voice of authority
and prestige far greater than any domestic trial forum to which the United States
74
would agree to an extradition. While the United States Constitution does per-
mit extradition to international tribunals with foreign rules,75 this certainly does
not mean that this country must agree, or should agree, to do so. Rather than to
submit to this institution, the United States and other stable democracies with
strong judicial systems, checks and balances on the use of power, and histories
of solid due process guarantees, should lead the world community in the devel-
opment of a tribunal that has the necessary legal structure to meet its great man-
date and that does not force strong countries to derogate from centuries of judi-
cial integrity.
The judicial stability and responsibility in the United States has allowed
for significant advances in areas of great need 76 but is certainly not the only ba-
sis for creation of an international criminal court. Strong democracies such as
Sweden and the United Kingdom developed over centuries of scholarship, ex-
perience, and stability, and maintained their high standards throughout the twen-
tieth century.77 As a whole, however, there is no such precedent in most of the
world.78 An effective ICC Statute must not reject the due process guarantees at
lenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519, 533 (1997) (defense council
could not get to the location of allegations, and one witness did not testify when his safety was not
secured after death threats).
74 See Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword
Mightier than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 213, 247-50 (2000) (arguing that the substantive
rights of Americans will be met at the ICC because it meets international minimal due process
standards and because the United States allows extradition to countries with legal systems not as
"well developed" or "well-defined" as U.S. law).
75 See Johan D. van der Vyver, International Human Rights: American Exceptionalism: Hu-
man Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775,
808-11 (2001).
76 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 54.01-.1 I (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2003) (setting forth
procedures for the defense and prosecution of minors in the Texas Juvenile Justice System, which
might have the most extensive due process guarantees in the world, based on the guarantees of the
United States and Texas Constitutions, and additional statutory guarantees designed to rehabilitate
and to maintain order and dignity in an accused person's life).
77 See, e.g., HUGO TIBERG ET AL., SWEDISH LAW: A SURVEY (James Hurst trans., 1994).
78 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, 'DOKUMENTY!' DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF RACE IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2003), http://www.amnesty.org/russia/pdfs/racism-report.pdf (detailing
persistence of extreme racism and virtual non-existence of due process guarantees for racial mi-
norities in Russia); AMNESTY INT'L & INT'L HELSINKI FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GREECE: IN THE
SHADOW OF IMPUNITY ILL-TREATMENT AND THE MISUSE OF FIREARMS (2002) (detailing serious
human rights violations in Greece), http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidocpdf.nsf/Index/EUR25022-
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the basis of strong common law and civil law legal structures that have been
developed over centuries of history. Otherwise, it will have little hope of suc-
cessfully being a responsible entity with the capability to maintain the credibil-
ity and relevance necessary to punish the most serious crimes of concern to the
79international community and to help prevent future war crimes.
The most basic issues that will secure the ICC's success and legitimacy
are due process guarantees. Beyond due process concerns are portions of the
statute that fail to protect against the effect of political forces on this unestab-
lished legal institution. The following is an analysis of problems in the ICC
Statute with a focus on the most critical deficiencies.
C. Political Influence Over a Fledgling Legal Institution
There are four major political problems in the ICC Statute.80 First, the
statute places considerable authority in the role of the ICC Prosecutor but does
not insulate the Office of the Prosecutor from the politics of the Assembly of
States Parties. In addition, the statute provides the court with political power
that infringes on the U.N. Security Council's capacity to effectively fulfill its
duties. Furthermore, the statute does not allow for exceptions to jurisdiction for
foreign troops from non-signatory countries invited by signatory countries into
their jurisdictions. Finally, the statute's jurisdiction is not truly complimentary
to sovereign countries.
1. Prevention of Political Pressure on the Office of the Prosecutor
The ICC Prosecutor serves for a period of nine years 8' and is elected by
an absolute majority of the Assembly of States Parties to the treaty. 82 The dep-
uty prosecutors are elected in the same manner and for the same term from a list
provided to the Assembly of States Parties by the ICC Prosecutor.83 An abso-
lute majority of the Assembly of States Parties can remove the Prosecutor for
2002ENGLISH; HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "NOTHING UNUSUAL": THE TORTURE
OF CHILDREN IN TURKEY (1992) (persistence of gross violations of international law regarding the
protection of the safety, dignity and due process rights of minors), http://docs.hrw.org/archives/
webarchive/archives/crd/TURKEY2.92 I/turkey292.htm.
79 See ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, pmbl. (stating the purposes of the ICC).
80 Many commentators have already addressed all of these problems. In this Article, I attempt
to take a fresh look at them and to provide feasible alternatives to the statute.
81 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 42, § 4.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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"serious misconduct" or a "serious breach" of duties. 84 Deputy prosecutors can-
not be removed without action by the Assembly.
8 5
This statutory scheme places extensive power over legal actors in the
Assembly of Member States, which is a political body. This oversight is not a
check on the justices and the Prosecutor, but rather a precarious infusion of poli-
tics into the legal system. The position of the ICC as an alternative to the use of
politics or force places the court's Prosecutor into a unique balancing act. It
must serve as a legal operative in pursuit of justice and must serve as a legal
operative with no law enforcement personnel to rely upon. It must serve in this
capacity while tightly constrained by the Assembly of Member States.
The ICC Prosecutor fits into several more structural constraints. The
ICC will never have an army, deputies, or substantial coercive power. This
separates the Prosecutor from the primary historical precedent in the Nuremberg
Tribunal. This tribunal was uniquely positioned to establish international law
because there were few political restraints upon it. The Allied armies had con-
quered Germany, captured war criminals, had complete access to the records of
the Axis Powers, and had a mandate as a victor's tribunal. The ICC, other than
a relatively weak requirement for state assistance,86 is in no such position. In
order for the ICC Prosecutor to be effective, the ICC Statute must therefore be
reformed to create extensive checks and balances to compensate for the court's
lack of a military mandate in most areas where it will attempt to assert jurisdic-
tion and to prevent the abuse of power within the mandate it has.
The statute states that the Office of the Prosecutor has the right to act
"independently as a separate organ of the Court. 87 In an attempt to isolate the
office from international politics (or at least the world's most powerful states),
the statute does not even permit the Prosecutor to be overseen by the U.N. Secu-
rity Council. The statute provides for a powerful prosecutor that can instigate
investigations and present them to an institution similar to a grand jury called
the Pre-Trial Chamber.88 The Pre-Trial Chamber is a body of judges that pro-
vides a weak check on the Prosecutor. It may question an investigation or reject
the filing of an indictment.89 Despite the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, it
may not completely prevent the Prosecutor from pursuing a charge9° because the
84 id. art. 46, §§ I(a), 2(b).
85 Id. art. 46, § (2)(c).
86 See id. art. 93.
87 Id. art. 42, § 1.
88 Id. art. 15. The ICC Statute establishes three situations that set into motion the exercise of
its jurisdiction: a state party referral of a situation to the Prosecutor for investigation, referral by
the United Nations Security Council, and independent initiation of an investigation by the Prose-
cutor. Id. art. 13(a)-(c).
89 Id. art. 15(4).
90 Id. arts. 53, 58.
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Prosecutor may continue to use its weight to further investigate a claim or re-
lated claim, even if the Pre-Trial Chamber rejects it. 9'
Ideally, the integrity of a prosecutor should keep him or her from being
handicapped by extra-legal politics. However, no matter how mindful a prose-
cutor at the ICC is, the process for selection and removal of the prosecutor vir-
tually guarantees that the Prosecutor will not be able to complete his or her re-
sponsibilities. The Assembly of Member States select and replace the individual
who holds this office,92 and have too much power over this person.
The mere potential for the Assembly of Member States to make good
decisions is not a reasonable rationale for leaving its power unchecked. This
body should nonetheless be commended for its choice of the first ICC Prosecu-
tor. The Assembly selected Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina to be the inau-
gural ICC Prosecutor. 93 Ocampo has experience prosecuting individuals within
the military dictatorship of Argentina for severe human rights abuses;94 he has
campaigned against governmental and corporate corruption95 and has reviewed
abuses within sham military trials following the Falkland Islands War.9 6 In ad-
dition, Ocampo has served as a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, is
widely respected both domestically and internationally,97 and has been a
thoughtful voice of pragmatism at the foundation of human rights law scholar-
ship.98 Nonetheless, the ICC Statute wedges Ocampo between weakness and
manipulation, leaving his wits restrained and his experience and integrity ham-
pered by perverse constraints. Even if Ocampo can be a John Marshall figure
and bring a legitimate rule of law under trying circumstances, the statute pro-
vides neither the support nor the checks and balances necessary for there to be a
lasting rule of law untarnished by nefarious and foolish political agendas.
Some of the legal systems of members of the Assembly of States Parties
are little more than "tools of repression." 99 The legal systems of approximately
91 Id. art. 15(5).
92 Id. arts. 42, 46, § (2)(b).
93 See Siobhan Roth, The World's Prosecutor, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 30, 2003,
http://support.casals.com/aaaflash 1/busca.asp?IDAAAControl=9270.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Transparency International Chapters in the
Americas Endorse the OAS Follow-up Mechanism to the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (June 5, 2001), at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleasesarchive/2001/2001.
06.05.costarica.html.
96 See Roth, supra note 93.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Luis Moreno Ocampo, Beyond Punishment: Justice in the Wake of Massive
Crimes in Argentina, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 669 (1999), available at 1999 WL 32962042.
99 LEE A. CASEY, FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD
OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (or-
ganization of human rights by ICC member state judicial system), http://www.fed-
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half of the Assembly of States Parties have been implicated in extreme human
rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings and torture.100 This body is likely
to be a similar body to the General Assembly of the United Nations, a body of
career diplomats, many of whom represent non-democratic nations with political
agendas that have little to do with the ideals at the basis of the United Nations or
the ICC. The United Nations General Assembly is an institution where political
horse-trading, nationalist agendas, and corrupted ideals have allowed ironically
disgusting appointments. This cynicism includes the appointment of Iraq as the
head of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament' 0 ' and Libya as the
head of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 0 2 Beyond irrespon-
sible horse-trading, it is a legitimate possibility that political mudslinging will
dilute the integrity of the Prosecutor at the ICC. There are already concerns that
member states have not followed the statute's mandated judicial nomination
procedures in order to nominate less qualified, but politically preferable nomi-
nees. 
10 3
World politics should be one of many checks, not the end-all authority
over the Prosecutor. The potential for mismanagement is magnified because
citizens in most constituent countries are not directly affected by the crimes
prosecuted at the ICC. This lack of attention by a citizenry affected by crime
leaves the Prosecutor disproportionately open to lobbying by interest groups
unchecked by the raw democratic scrutiny that faces prosecutors in domestic
systems, and directly impairs the rule of law. A workable statute demands more
safety measures to prevent states in the Assembly of States Parties with weak
national judicial systems, or states with manipulative or irresponsible diplomats,
from bringing misplaced expectations and improper political authority over the
role of the Prosecutor.' °4 The mere possibility that the statute allows the Office
of the Prosecutor to be abused, destroys the credibility of the court.
soc.org/Intllaw&%20AmerSov/CaseyHRR.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
1oo Id.
10' Rumsfeld Has Harsh Words for Allies, U.N., ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, avail-
able at 2003 WL 12203709 (suggesting irony of Iraq's position as head of the U.N. Commission
of Disarmament while U.N. Security Council determines if Iraq has violated its mandates to dis-
arm).
102 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Libya Confirms Why It Is Wrong for UN Rights
Chair (Aug. 20, 2002), http://hrw.org/press/2002/08libyaO82002.htm.
103 Civil Society Expresses Concern About Nomination Process of Judges to the ICC, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/otherl2002/1202icc.htm (discussing that The Coalition for
an International Criminal Court, a private organization that managed drafting convention's lobby-
ist coalition, now has concern that Statute approved is not being followed).
104 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 345 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
("'The concentra[tion] [of power] in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic gov-
ernment. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and
not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as
one."') (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 195 (1801)).
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ICC activist and former Nuremberg Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz as-
serts, "The truth is that no other Prosecutor in human history has been subjected
to as many controls as exist in the ICC Statute . . ,.0. A brief look at the
criminal justice system in the United States shows this statement to be inaccu-
rate. In the United States, there is a long history of prosecutorial autonomy de-
spite intense political pressures. 1 6 Prosecutors' decisions are regularly chal-
lenged, but there is no movement to vest prosecutorial authority elsewhere10 7 or
even a desire for such a movement. This is largely due to extensive structural
controls that check and balance the power of autonomous prosecutors and pre-
vent the abuse of power within this system. United States prosecutors have con-
siderable power'08 that is held in check by a strong federal constitution, addi-
tional state laws,' 09 normative models for systematic examination and reexami-
nation of the law," 0 consistent judicial enforcement of standards that are usually
105 Benjamin B. Ferencz, Misguided Fears About the International Criminal Court, 15 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 223, 231 (2003).
106 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1323-91 (2002) (detailing the history of criminal prose-
cution in New York City in the context of tensions between public opinion, scholarly prescrip-
tions, and the actual policies of modem and historical prosecutors' offices).
107 But see Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Re-
form: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 542, 553-665 (1990) (arguing that certain features of the French criminal justice system
could reform the United States system, including restrictions on the power of the prosecutor and a
narrower scope of the field of criminal law); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint on Prosecutorial
Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (1981) (calling for limitations on prosecutorial power).
108 See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Few subjects are less
adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when
and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to
dismiss a proceeding once brought."); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d. 167 (5th Cir.
1965); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. CoMp. L. (Supp.) 643, 645-
64 (2002) (discussing the broad prosecutorial discretion in charging function).
109 See HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 23; TEX. CONST. art. I § 9; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 39.14 (Vernon 2002), for examples of states that have constitutions and
statutes putting far greater restrictions on the admissibility of evidence, much broader exclusion-
ary rules, and a greater right to privacy than the United States Constitution. See also State v.
Okubo, 651 P.2d 494 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (extending right to privacy); Dist. Attorney for the
Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980) (death penalty violates state constitution);
State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (mandating that police videotape all custodial
interrogations, including Miranda warning); Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1986) (pro-
viding greater restrictions for admissibility of evidence). See generally Patrick Baude, Interstate
Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 835 (1997) (noting relationship between
distinctive histories of different regions and the state constitutional procedures for protecting
individual rights); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing use of state constitutions to protect individual
rights).
110 See Erik Luna, The Model Penal Code Revisited: Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 516-25 (2000) (historical use of Model Penal Code as an instrument of
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very clear, consistent attempts at expansion of constitutional norms by an
autonomous defense,' the absolute right of a defendant to the first level of ap-
peal in a multi-layered system of appellate review,' 2 professional organizations
with high standards,'' 3 the accountability of a local electorate," 14 close scrutiny
by police unions and victims' rights lobbies, and open media coverage." 5 Each
check on prosecutorial power has developed at least one legal doctrine designed
to prevent the abuse of power. Such checks on prosecutorial power include pro-
hibitions against discriminatory or selective prosecutions"16 and checks on vin-
dictive prosecution."
7
reform in dozens of state codes and thousands of appellate opinions and call for radical change to
model code to encourage further checks on State power).
III See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (right to
counsel in all criminal proceedings).
112 See Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2001) (comparing extensive appellate system in United States
to relatively scant appellate rights in England).
113 E.g., American Bar Association (www.abanet.org); Texas District and County Attorneys'
Association (www.tdcaa.com); Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers' Association (www.tcdla.com);
National Judicial College (www.judges.org).
114 Almost every state of the United States has locally elected prosecutors. See William T.
Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1338-40 (1993) (arguing
that elected local prosecutors have greater political accountability than unelected officials in the
legal system).
115 Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 765
(2001) (discussing the roles of the media and public on checking prosecutorial conduct); see, e.g.,
Michelle Mittelstadt, Tulia to Get House Review at Request of Black Caucus, Congress to Investi-
gate Drug Arrests, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 8, 2003, 2003 WL 71205044 (probing into
Texas scandal regarding prosecution and imprisonment, for long periods of time, on weak evi-
dence, with accusations of racist targeting of innocent defendants, and further investigation into
similar problems in other parts of the United States).
116 Compare United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (discussing discovery standards
and burden in selective prosecution claim); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (decision whether
to prosecute may not be based on "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbi-
trary classification"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination based on race and
nationality); United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1983) (discrimination based on
union membership); United States v. Alleyne, 454 F. Supp. 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (racial dis-
crimination); State v. McCollum, 464 N.W.2d 44 (Wis. 1990) (gender discrimination), with ICC
STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 21, § 3 (permitting no prosecution based on "age, race, col[or], lan-
guage, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth
or other status"); id. art. 42, §§ 5, 7 (prohibiting prosecutorial engagement "in any activity which
is likely to interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to affect confidence in his or her
independence" or participation "in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be
doubted on any ground").
117 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (finding realistic likelihood of prosecutorial
vindictiveness requires reversal).
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The Office of the Prosecutor would better maintain its autonomy with a
longer term of office and complete control over the hiring and firing of deputy
prosecutors. A longer term of office would help prevent unnecessary interfer-
ence with its role. Also, the terms "serious misconduct" and "serious breach of
duties"' 18 must be meticulously defined to prevent the providing of credibility in
attempts at the removal of the ICC Prosecutor based on more subjective
grounds. On a larger scale, there are simply not enough checks and balances in
the ICC; it must be more difficult to remove the Prosecutor." 19
A less political method for removal of the Prosecutor could simply fol-
low the same procedures that are used to remove a judge. Under the ICC Stat-
ute, justices of the court may only be removed by the other justices. 120 A justice
can be removed by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties upon
a recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the other justices.121 The
removal process for the Prosecutor should be more like the judicial removal
process because the judicial removal process is less likely to be prone to viola-
tions by international politics.
Nonetheless, the judicial chambers may not be the most appropriate
place to instigate the removal of the Prosecutor because the Prosecutor is a party
to the proceedings in the court. The statute could instead be amended to permit
petition by the Assembly of States Parties to a special removal committee made
up of the justices of the court. This would keep the preliminary steps of the
process and open debate about the reasons for removal within the powers of the
Assembly of States Parties, but would spread this responsibility to more than
one branch of the institution. 122
A removal committee would only be organized if the Assembly filed a
petition. A petition for removal would be filed upon a vote to file approved by
an absolute majority of the member states. The removal committee would have
to be large enough to have a diversity of voices amongst the justices. A mini-
mum of nine of the eighteen justices on the court, chosen at random, could re-
ceive the petition and any other documentation any member state wishes to pre-
sent. A simple majority vote of the justices on the committee would remove the
118 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 46, §§ 1(a), 2(b).
119 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 196 1)
(arguing that it is "a reflection upon human nature" that "auxiliary precautions" are necessary
within a public entity, in order that "the members of each department should be as little dependent
as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices" in order to prevent
the concentration of power in one part of a legal structure or another where it would be more
subject to abuse).
120 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 46, § 2(a).
121 Id. art. 46, § 2(b).
122 See THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 416 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
("The people can never willfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by
the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legisla-
tive trust is lodged in the hands of one body ....").
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Prosecutor. The justices of the removal committee would write opinions de-
scribing their reasons for removal or non-removal and announce their decision
in open court.
This set of procedures would force a reasoned legal process. This proc-
ess would permit the removal of a Prosecutor only if necessary. At the same
time, it would force states, improperly attempting to manipulate the role of
Prosecutor, into the public eye and into a dignified forum for complaints against
the Office of the Prosecutor. It would also create a system of checks and bal-
ances that establishes a real autonomy for the Office of the Prosecutor, while
keeping it accountable and not taking away the Assembly of Member States'
role in the removal process.
Finally, no matter how high the integrity of the ICC Prosecutor, in the
chaotic world of mass terrorism and rogue states with weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the Office of the Prosecutor will face political questions that are beyond the
role of a prosecuting attorney. The independence of this office has the power to
indict anyone in the world. The U.N. Security Council, despite its political fail-
ures that have allowed war criminals to thrive in Kosovo, Rwanda, Iraq, and
other genocidal hotspots across the world, is the only international institution
capable of being a stabilizing check on the power of the ICC Prosecutor. 23 The
ICC Statute far from respects this need and has dangerously isolated the U.N.
Security Council from the ICC by placing the power of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil into the Assembly of Member States, which, as discussed above, is not an
institution with any established credibility.
2. The Statute's Infringement on the Role of the United Nations
Security Council
The most blatant problem with the ICC Statute is the power it gives to
unelected, unaccountable international justices. The statute allows justices of
the court to infringe upon the role of the U.N. Security Council by not having
express provisions within it that prevent them from making rulings that define a
wider scope of the court's authority than is permitted under the United Nations
Charter ("U.N. Charter"). The statute must contain limitations to the justices'
authority to expand the court's power under the color of law. Article 16 of the
statute provides for a limited process by which the U.N. Security Council may
defer an investigation or prosecution by requiring that,
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or pro-
ceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after
123 Some observers argue that there is far too much independence in the Office of the Prosecu-
tor. See, e.g., Kristafer Ailslieger, Note, Why the United States Should Be Wary of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Concerns Over Sovereignty and Constitutional Guarantees, 39 WASHBURN
L.J. 80, 90 (1999) (arguing that the prosecutor's power to initiate investigations on its own gives
the office "the potential to become a grand inquisitor of unprecedented dimensions").
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the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under
the same conditions. 124
This provision does not provide a sufficient check because it does not guard
against activist judges and overly aggressive prosecutors by expressly limiting
the authority of a justice to overrule treaty-based law.
Article 16 of the ICC Statute is unreasonably and unnecessarily close to
a violation of the U.N. Charter because it does not affirmatively prohibit the
court's justices from asserting authority equal to or superior to the United Na-
tions. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter places the treaty creating the United Na-
tions superior to all other treaties.125 Furthermore, Article 39 of the U.N. Char-
ter expressly articulates that it is the role of the U.N. Security Council to deter-
mine what measures should be taken "to maintain or restore international peace
and security.' ' 126 Additionally, Articles 25 and 48 of the U.N. Charter require
that member states of the United Nations "agree to accept and carry out the de-
cisions of the Security Council" made in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.
27
Since every signatory to the ICC Statute is also a signatory to the U.N.
Charter, every signatory to the statute is placing itself in the position of permit-
ting a justice to make a ruling that violates the U.N. Charter. The Assembly of
States Parties of the International Criminal Court has drafted a document to de-
fine its relationship with the United Nations. 128  However, nowhere in this
document does the Assembly of States Parties affirmatively recognize its mem-
bers' responsibilities under Articles 25, 39, or 103 of the U.N. Charter; nor does
this document in any way seek to address this critical conflict.
129
Despite this basic problem, Article 16 of the ICC Statute still has a
wider problem. The requirement in this article for there to be an affirmative
vote by the U.N. Security Council in order to stop an investigation or a prosecu-
tion - in light of the U.N. Security Council's historic incapacity to take af-
firmative actions in the Balkans, Rwanda, Iraq and elsewhere - marginalizes
124 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 16.
125 U.N. CHARTER art. 103; cf Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
(U.N. Charter precepts are "basic principles of international law.").
126 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
127 Id. arts. 25, 48.
128 ASSEMBLY OF STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, FIRST
SESSION: NEW YORK, 3-10 SEPTEMBER 2002 OFFICIAL RECORDS, at 244-57, U.N. Doc. ICC-
ASP/l/3, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.2 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/aspfra.htm.
129 See id.
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the one body that has the capability to stop the court from acting imprudently.
This is significant because it allows the court to proceed when one permanent
U.N. Security Council member objects to a resolution requesting deferral, and
requires that deferral be sought by means of a formal resolution.130
This requirement of an affirmative act of the U.N. Security Council, un-
der these circumstances, is essentially acting as a de facto amendment to the
U.N. Charter that improperly restrains the U.N. Security Council by creating a
legal mechanism not contemplated by the drafters of the Charter. These circum-
stances are unique; the ICC is neither an independent state nor a private entity.
The ICC is a unique public international body, worldwide in its authority, cre-
ated outside of the United Nations, and designed such that it can assert powers
that rival those of the U.N. Security Council. The ICC is so unique that it is the
only entity in the world that defines its own relationship with the U.N. Security
Council under the color of international law. The ICC Statute's choice of defi-
nition for this relationship is an attempt to assert power in a way that fundamen-
tally changes the dynamics of the United Nations without amending the U.N.
Charter.
Adjustments of the authority of the U.N. Security Council must come
through amendments to the U.N. Charter, not through other treaty making pro-
cedures. Any other attempt at change to the power of the U.N. Security Council
is a destabilizing conflict with Article 49 of the United Nations Charter, which
requires member states to "join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out
the measures decided upon by the U.N. Security Council.' 31 This destabiliza-
tion hinders the U.N. Security Council's potential to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security pursuant to its mandate under Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter by permitting an overly-aggressive Prosecutor, or activist collection of
justices, to regulate problems that require a political or military solution.
This is an unnecessary and dangerous break with established interna-
tional law that takes legitimacy from the ICC. The United Nations was created
based on the recognition that the chaotic nature of international relations re-
quires an international organization to secure peaceful dispute resolution and
international cooperation.' 32 Unlike the ICC, the U.N. Security Council is de-
signed to be the political entity to prevent breaches of the peace and security of
the world. 33 Circumvention of the U.N. Security Council is dangerous because
the Security Council is the only universally legitimate international entity capa-
ble of acting with a united voice and the only multilateral authority remotely
capable of effectively acting to address a crisis anywhere in the world.
130 See generally Jelena Pejic, The United States and the International Criminal Court: One
Loophole Too Many, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 283-84 (2001) (explaining the relationship
defined in the Statute between the Court and the Security Council).
131 U.N. CHARTER art. 49.
132 Id. pmbl.
133 See id. ch. V.
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The ICC is an instrument designed to administer fair trials for alleged
war criminals. But this circumvention permits the court to address political
questions, rather than questions of law, in a backdoor change to the framework
of the United Nations. If a need for reform or radical change to the U.N. Char-
ter exists, an international tribunal is not the appropriate venue for such a de-
bate. 134 In this respect, the ICC Statute appears more concerned with politics
than achieving its goal of making the world a safer place with predictable inter-
national standards of justice.
Some basic clarifications in the statute would alleviate this problem.
The statute must contain language that expressly prohibits judicial activism and
affirmatively recognizes the role of the U.N. Security Council. The statute must
also contain language that defines the limits of the court's authority. This must
be a clear limitation and would be best drafted in the form of an international
political question doctrine.
35
The Political Question Doctrine, in the United States, is a recognition of
the checks and balances expressly set out in the Constitution. 36 A court gener-
ally cannot address a political question. In invoking the political question doc-
trine, a court acknowledges the possibility that an issue may not be judicially
enforceable but does not assert that there is no possible remedy to the issue.
37
Without the principles of a clear international political question doctrine be-
tween the United Nations and the ICC, the parameters of Article 16 of the ICC
Statute will not be properly defined, and there will be unnecessary tension in the
relationship between the ICC and the United Nations.
3. The Statute's Exposure of American Soldiers to Unwarranted
Prosecution
The jurisdiction claimed by the ICC Statute is not congruent with the
stabilizing force that maintains the geopolitical balance that allows the court to
exist. This stability is an especially durable reality for the United States because
it involves thousands of its citizens in uniform. Article 12 of the statute asserts
134 Compare Lybia v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14) (explaining International Court
of Justice's decision not to challenge the role of the Security Council).
135 A political question is an issue that requires analysis in an area in which there is a textually
demonstrable commitment of the issue to another authority and a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226-38
(1993) (issues surrounding the impeachment of federal judges solely in the legislative branch of
government and a check on the power of the judicial branch of government); Pac. States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133-51 (1912) (holding challenge to initiative and referendum
provisions of state constitution political questions); cf United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (stating Congress's plenary power over Indian Tribes, particularly in
regard to issues of past ethnic cleansing, not a political question).
136 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 224.
137 See Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992).
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jurisdiction over all people in countries that sign the treaty that created the
ICC. 138 Thus, if a country that chooses to host foreign troops is a signatory to
the ICC Statute, these troops can now be brought before the ICC. This claim of
jurisdiction includes countries such as: Columbia or the Philippines, where
American troops are invited to assist with domestic security threats that directly
affect United States security and world stability; Germany and South Korea,
where American troops' presence create the stability that free markets and de-
mocracy need to exist; or any other states where American troops are stationed.
This leaves United States troops with far greater legal exposure to politically
motivated charges at the ICC than any other state.
Certain provisions of the statute even act as double standards that put
the United States in far greater jeopardy of abusive action within the court's
jurisdiction than any other state. Article 124 allows a country to sign the statute
but to defer the application of jurisdiction upon it for a seven-year period.' 39
Additionally, Article 12 allows as well for non-signatories to present cases to
the court while not being bound by the statute for prosecution of its own citi-
zens. 4° Nonetheless, scholarly discussion of the court's jurisdiction runs the
risk of ignoring fundamental political realities at the basis of these provisions.
A major argument in defense of a wide application of jurisdiction is that
such application is indistinguishable from a situation in which another country
tries a United States citizen who breaks that country's laws while within that
country's territory.'14  This argument ignores the political realities and security
threats that require American troops to remain abroad and ignores the wide
shadow that international politics cast over the super-national authority claimed
by the ICC. One professor goes so far as to argue that any American exception
to the jurisdiction of the court "is rationally indefensible and morally corrupt." '142
Such rhetoric is unproductive because, like the argument above, it fails to ac-
count for the unique predicaments faced by the United States. If the United
States withdraws its troops from signatory countries where they are invited,
world security will be dramatically weakened and more war crimes may take
place. 143 Both judicial and appropriate military action bring peace, and neither
should be permitted diminish the effectiveness of the other.'44
138 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 12.
139 Id. art. 124.
140 Id. art. 12, §§ 2, 3.
141 See, e.g., Alison M. McIntire, Be Careful What You Wish for Because You Just Might Get
It: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 249,
262-65 (2001).
142 van der Vyver, supra note 75, at 819.
143 Compare Grant McLoone, Book Note, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, I I USAFA J. LEGAL
STUD. 161, 164-65 (2002) (arguing that book's thesis that Americans should be prosecuted for
international crimes committed during the Cold War ignores the fact that many allegedly criminal
acts were done to prevent world dominance by Soviet totalitarianism and the greater crimes such
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Therefore, Article 12 must be amended to adjust the ICC Statute to the
political realities that keep American troops overseas. These realities are based
on the fact that to prevent massive crimes against humanity such as those that
occurred in Kosovo or Baghdad, and defend against huge terrorist strikes, the
United States may have to lead unilaterally and bear the brunt of most interna-
tional deterrence. 145 This places the United States at a uniquely high risk of
unwarranted and politically motivated attacks at the court. As a result, the
United States must be able to enter into bilateral agreements with allied coun-
tries where its troops are stationed that allow a waiver of enforcement of the
ICC Statute (unless the United States agrees to an amended form of the statute).
This need for an American exception is less justifiable from a European
point of view which rejected militarism while under the United States' protec-
tion during the Cold War and from the developing world's point of view which,
unless working closely with American troops, may view the American troops'
presence as imperialist. From the American point of view, the assertion of ju-
risdiction in Article 12 is no more than a slight of hand, written such that it that
removes the protections of the United States Constitution from thousands of
service men and women and discourages American participation in peacekeep-
ing and humanitarian operations. The United States has offered generous com-
promises to opposing parties that shield American soldiers from little more than
foreign arrest, but these attempts to bridge this gap have fallen on deaf ears or
faced "reflexive opposition" by active ICC proponents. 146 If the United States'
allies on the court do not recognize the challenges faced by the United States,
47
then this country will never be able to legitimately recognize the jurisdiction of
the court. As a result, the ICC will be far less relevant to the workings of inter-
national affairs and perhaps a complete failure.
4. Complementarity
Article 17 of the statute states that the ICC does not have jurisdiction to
hear cases that are being investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction,
unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to impartially or independently
dominance would bring), with Jan Knippers Black, Bush's Withdrawal from International Court
Undermines Justice, PROGRESSIVE MEDIA PROJECT, May 16, 2002 (approving of use of the ICC as
a mechanism that could "tie the hands of the U.S. Military" and "give pause to future powerbrok-
ers who would blithely toy with the fates of peoples around the world"), at
http://www.progressive.org.
144 See Smidt, supra note 49, at 157.
145 Id. at 178.
146 See Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001, at
193, 203-07.
147 See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Should Libertarianism Stop at the Water's Edge?, REASON, Aug.
2003, at 47 (calling for modified "Reagan Doctrine" to win the conflict against Al- Qaeda and
similar direct threats to the United States, liberal democracy and the rule of law).
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carry out the investigation or prosecution in a manner designed to serve jus-
tice.148 This mechanism, while it exposes the weakness of the ICC because it
would be very difficult to enforce an order under this article, 49 effectively
places no guarantees that the enforcement of exceptions to this complementarity
will be interpreted narrowly. Therefore, Article 17 essentially acts as a blank
check that leaves it up to international judges to determine their own jurisdic-
tion.
To keep this discretion from being abused, the statute must spell out
clear, objective, and well-defined standards upon which a justice of the court
can base such a decision. These standards must mandate: (1) a detailed expla-
nation of the applicable law in the national jurisdiction; (2) a detailed explana-
tion of why the law was not properly administered; (3) a detailed explanation of
what is lacking in the applicable law or legal system; (4) a statement of exactly
whom or what is preventing the independence of the investigation or prosecu-
tion; and (5) a detailed explanation of how any individual or institutional obsta-
cle listed is preventing investigation or prosecution. The statute must also ex-
plicitly respect the rulings of military justice systems, unless: (1) the court is
purely within an executive branch of government; (2) there is a showing that
there is no procedure for independent appellate review or habeas corpus in the
judicial branch of a government; or (3) the court is not legislatively created or
reviewable.
Finally, the statute must be amended with a limited fight of appeal to the
U.N. Security Council to determine if the justices have abused their discretion in
asserting jurisdiction where a national judicial system has exercised its author-
ity. Most scholarly discussion of this section of the statute works solely within
the paradigm that states must either accept an international criminal court with
limitless jurisdiction or a court circumscribed solely by complementary jurisdic-
tion. 50 This perspective is a false dichotomy. In order to depoliticize the court,
the jurisdiction mandated in the statute must be circumscribed by a limited out-
side check on the court's power.
The risk of a veto by the U.N. Security Council based on raw politics
would be particularly limited if the right to appeal to the Security Council is
limited with an abuse of discretion standard of review. Under this standard of
review, the reviewing authority must view the case in the light most favorable to
the prior authority's ruling, indulge every presumption in favor of that ruling,
148 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 17.
149 See Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 57, 82-86
(2001) (discussing difficulties in enforcing this mechanism with analogy to Libya's attempt to try
the alleged perpetrators of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in contraven-
tion of Security Council Resolutions to the contrary within wider argument that the complemen-
tarity provision of the ICC Statute compromises the authority of the ICC).
150 See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 389 (1998).
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and reverse that decision only if the decision is made "arbitrarily, unreasonably
or without reference to any guiding principles."' 51 This is the most deferential
standard of review and it prohibits the reviewing authority from simply substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the prior ruling authority's decision. 52
The need for this limited outside check is particularly critical because, if
there is any challenge to the actions it chooses to take, the ICC will be powerless
without the support of the U.N. Security Council to fulfill its mandate. This
check on the power of the ICC would be extremely limited because the abuse of
discretion legal standard is precise and limited. 53 The court, with this limited
check on its power, will then be more likely to be impartial, reliable, and depoli-
ticized.1
54
D. Due Process of Law: The ICC Statute's Failings
Winston Churchill advocated summary execution as the appropriate
way to deal with high-level war criminals. 55 The greatest precedent to come
from the Nuremberg Tribunal is the spotlight of due process guarantees. 156 This
151 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 45 S.W.3d 182, 186 (Tex. App. 2001).
152 United States v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir. 1985).
153 See Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner's Clear Reflection of Income Power Under §
446(B) and the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review: Where Has the Rule of Law Gone, and
Can We Get It Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69, 97-101 (2000) (discussing the extent to which the
abuse of discretion standard of review limits a reviewing authority in the context of argument that
the abuse of discretion standard of review essentially keeps cases within the executive branch and
out of the Article III courts).
154 Cf Brown, supra note 150, at 388-89 (calling for balance between Security Council and
ICC that allows for a court that is "impartial, reliable, and depoliticized" in its "process for identi-
fying the most important cases of international concern, evaluating the action of national justice
systems with regard to those cases, and triggering the jurisdiction of the ICC when it is truly nec-
essary").
155 Gary Jonathan Bass, War Crimes and the Limits of Legalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2103, 2109
(1999) (noting that Stalin wanted to execute approximately 100,000 Germans, and Churchill vig-
orously disagreed with Stalin and only advocated summary execution of fifty or one hundred Axis
leaders).
156 In the words of Justice Jackson, former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
and Chief Council for the Prosecution at the Nuremberg,
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants to-
day is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these de-
fendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must
summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial
will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do jus-
tice.
Second Day, in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, supra note 26, at 95, 99 (giving the opening statement for the prosecution in the Nur-
emberg Trials on November 20, 1945).
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light is dependent on expectations of high standards of due process of law, even
for the most despicable human beings, and knowledge that the world community
can subdue its passions and improve itself in legal procedures with high stan-
dards to develop the law.
Critical reviews of the due process standards at the ICC are generally
too tepid. 57 In the United States, there exists a strong history of carefully
guarding the rights of people accused of horrendous crimes while maintaining
efficient law enforcement, 58 and carefully limiting the powers of parties that
wield power. The ICC Statute places very few limits on the parties it governs
and does not adequately provide the tools necessary for the ICC justices to make
delicate legal decisions. These inadequacies are particularly problematic be-
cause international criminal law is extremely undeveloped, and because the ICC
will not be responsible to any judicial organization to hear the appeals of its
decisions.
Most of the diplomats who worked on the statute "lacked expertise in
international criminal law, comparative criminal law, or comparative criminal
procedure[,]" and "had no criminal practice experience of any kind."' 159 Many
came from developed countries where the basic procedures in the domestic legal
systems regularly fall far below even the basic norms of universal due process
guarantees deemed acceptable by international law academia. One leading aca-
demic advocating immediate subordination to the court nonetheless asserts,
"Prosecution of [crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC] is indeed subject to
universal norms of due process, which are specified in great detail in the ICC
Statute and which do not fall one inch short of the principles of criminal justice
recognized in the United States."' 6  As the following detailed comparative
analysis will show, this professor's statement is clearly incorrect since it is read-
157 See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 71, at 608-09.
158 An example of this balance in a case as reprehensible as anything that will ever come before
the ICC is articulated in an opinion by Justice Brown, formerly of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals:
This case presents in dramatic terms the tensions between promoting thorough
and efficient enforcement of the laws and ensuring that the rights of the ac-
cused are scrupulously guarded. We have on the one hand a murder [that]
could hardly have been more reprehensible; the violent, senseless slaying of a
young girl. On the other hand, we have a decision by a panel of this Court
throwing out [the defendant]'s two written confessions on the grounds of vol-
untariness, making it very unlikely that [the defendant] could again be con-
victed on retrial.
Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 956 (5th Cir. 1980) (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
159 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 460 (1999). For a discussion of the result of
these deficiencies, see infra Part V.
160 van der Vyver, supra note 75, at 809.
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ily apparent that United States has far higher due process standards than the
International Criminal Court.
The ICC Statute is silent about numerous basic guarantees that are taken
for granted in the United States' criminal justice system. There is no reference
to the concept of a fight to privacy.' 6' There is no protection from witness tam-
pering. 62 There is no hearsay rule. 163 The discovery guarantees are vague.'
64
There is no reference to the concept of chain of custody necessary for evidence
collected.165 There is no right to review of allegations of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.16 6 There is no definition of effective counsel. 67 There is no requirement
161 But see George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New Inter-
national Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 323
(2001) (arguing that, although the Statute does not expressly reference rights to privacy, the right
survives because it is implicit in the statute, as an "'internationally recognized human right' under
the Rome [ICC] Statute's article 21(3)" and because "[iut falls within the Court's enumerated
sources of applicable law"). Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute states, "The application and interpre-
tation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human
rights . I..." ]CC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 21(3). Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights contains a very basic set of due process guarantees that also could be
applicable under this theory. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, came into
force Mar. 23, 1976, at 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. A workable statute, however, does not require
vague cross-references to protect basic rights.
162 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.13 (Consol. 2003); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 1510 (2003).
This was a very significant issue at the International Criminal Court for Rwanda. See, e.g., Prose-
cutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Decision on Juvenal Kajelijelis Motion for Protec-
tive Meausures for Defense Witnesses 3 (ICTR Trial Chamber II Apr. 3, 2001) (defense claim
that defense witnesses were "killed mysteriously or beaten to death"), at http://www.ictr.org (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004).
163 See, e.g., R.I.R. EVID. 801(c); W. VA. R. EvID. 801(c); State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349, 355
(Mo. 1981); cf Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., IT-96-21 -T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecution
for the Admissibility of Evidence (ICTY Trial Chamber Jan. 19, 1998) (disregard of hearsay prin-
ciples at ICTY), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialcz/decision-e/801 19EV21.htm.
164 Compare ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 67, § I(e), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5
(Deering 2003); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (excluding witness presented in violation
of discovery request). The ICC Statute requires that the Prosecutor provide evidence at the basis
of the prosecution to the Pre-Trial Chamber where the defendant and his attorney may be present,
but there are no clear affirmative rights of the defendant to make discovery requests. See ICC
STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 61, § 3(b).
165 See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 540 P.2d 677, 679 (Ariz. 1975); State v. Holbrooks, 983 S.W.2d
697, 700-01 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
166 See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256-58 (1988).
167 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984). There is a growing criticism
that, as international criminal law becomes more institutionalized, criminal defense remains ad
hoc and less developed. See Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1943, 1994-2002 (2001) (arguing that tribunal-wide structural flaws in the ICC, such as
ineffective defense counsel, and not procedural innovations, are the most pressing threats to de-
fendants at ICCs) [hereinafter Developments].
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that a conviction be based on more than a co-actor's testimony. 68 There is no
basis for determining whether a confession was properly obtained. 69 There is
no requirement of evidence to corroborate a confession. 70 There is no concept
of offense nullification. 7'
Despite the extreme gaps in the ICC Statute, there are some significant
due process guarantees. The burden of proof is on the prosecutor, utilizing the
general criminal law standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 72 The statute pro-
scribes the following rights: the right to be tried without undue delay; 73 the
right to be present at trial; 74 the right to a public trial; 75 the right to conduct a
defense; 76 the right to counsel, free of charge if necessary; 177 a limited right of
cross examination; 78 the right to have the assistance of an interpreter; 79 the
right to a written statement of charges;18° the right to bail;' 8' a limited right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;182 the right not to make a statement
of any kind and not have that silence used as evidence;183 a prohibition of ex
post facto prosecutions;184 freedom from warrantless arrest and search; 85 a lim-
168 See, e.g., State v. Haugen, 448 N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1989) ("The purpose of corroborat-
ing evidence is to show that accomplices are reliable witnesses and worthy of credit."); Fleming v.
State, 760 P.2d 208, 209-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ("The purpose behind the requirement of
corroboration is to protect an accused from being falsely implicated by another criminal in the
hope of clemency, a desire for revenge, or for any other reason.").
169 Cf ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 67, § 1 (g) (right to remain silent).
170 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) ("[S]ound law enforcement
requires police investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused.").
171 See generally Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification as a Defense Strategy, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. &
C.R. 1 (1995) (discussing element to the democratic system of justice in the United States that a
finder of fact may come to conclusions that are contrary to the evidence presented if a prosecutor
brings forth a case that should not be prosecuted).
172 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, arts. 66, 67.
173 Id. art. 67, § I(c).
174 Id. art. 63.
175 Id. art. 64, § 7.
176 Id. art. 67, § I(d).
177 Id. art. 55, § 2(c).
178 Id. art. 67, § I(e).
179 Id. art. 55, § I(c).
180 Id. art. 61, § 3(a).
181 Id. art. 60, § 2.
182 Id. art. 67, § I (e).
183 Id. art. 55, § 2(b).
184 ld. art. 22.
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ited right to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence; 86 limited double jeopardy
rights; 87 and basic Brady rights to evidence in the possession of the prosecutor
that "shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the
guilt of the accused. ,,88
Some of the rights guaranteed in the statute are clear. The presumption
of innocence, the guarantees of a public trial, to be present at trial, to court ap-
pointed counsel, to an interpreter, and the right to remain silent are satisfactorily
stated and do not need clarification. Other rights listed are not clear or, on the
face of the statute, are not adequately guaranteed. The Assembly of States Par-
ties has promulgated rules of evidence that create some discovery standards and
some predictability to the proceedings. 89 However, these rules are not statutory
guarantees created by the international treaty-making process. They are rele-
gated to the status of mere instruments approved by a simple majority of the
Assembly of Member States. This process is an inadequate method for drafting
the cornerstones of due process at a major international judicial institution.
Any law that comes from the Assembly of Member States, or from the justices
of the court, may too easily be changed and takes the treaty-making power away
from sovereign countries and gives it to an unchecked international body. The
ICC Statute must be reformed to include a firm bill of rights to set minimum
restrictions on the use of power that includes far more than the sketch in the
current statute. The most crucial rights that clearly need protection are dis-
cussed below.
1. Notice Requirements and Discovery Rules
The ICC Statute is unclear about how much notice of charges pending
against an accused person is necessary.' 90 It would be easy to quash an ICC
charging instrument in the United States if the charging instrument met no more
than the minimum requirements in the statute. The statute must be reformed to
insure there are firm guarantees of ample time to respond to allegations and to
know with reasonable specificity the details of the allegations. If the statute
allows the Prosecutor to rearrange its pleadings without adequate notice to the
defense, it runs the risk of making it effectively impossible to defend even the
185 Id. arts. 55, § I(d), 57-59.
186 Id. art. 69.
187 Id. art. 20.
188 Id. art. 67, § 2.
189 See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, PCNICC/2000/I /Add. I (2000), at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC
/GEN/NOO/724/06/PDF/NO072406.pdf.
190 Cf ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
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most basic of charges. 191 The statute must clearly state fair discovery rights to
be exercised after receiving proper notice. The clarification of discovery proce-
dures in separate promulgations by the Assembly of Member States is neces-
sary, but without a clear statement of fair discovery rights in the ICC Statute, all
authority to the contrary is strengthened, and the fairness and legitimacy of the
court is unnecessarily jeopardized.
2. Illegally Obtained Evidence
The standard for an exclusionary rule for improperly obtained evidence
in the ICC Statute is particularly disturbing because it is unnecessarily vague
and not centered upon the rights of the accused.' 92 The ICC Statute does not
permit investigation into how a state collects evidence brought before the court
or require the prosecution to establish a chain of custody of the evidence.193 The
statute merely states that evidence should be excluded if obtained in violation of
the statute or internationally recognized human rights standards if: "(a) The
violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b) The
admission of such evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously dam-
age the integrity of the proceedings."'' 94 This standard is not a sufficient basis for
a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine because it merely makes reference to eth-
ics and the integrity of the ICC, rather than being couched in terms of the rights
of the accused.
While foreign evidence obtained in violation of the United States Con-
stitution can be admissible in United States Courts,195 such a situation is so rare
that it is an exception that proves a general rule. Every year, thousands of cases
are reversed or thrown out of court in the United States on the basis of a sup-
pression of improperly obtained evidence because of the strict evidentiary re-
quirements mandated by the United States Constitution. 96 This evidence may
be extremely reliable, and the integrity of a court may not be affected by an ille-
gal search or seizure; however, the evidence is still excluded to protect the rights
191 See, e.g., Beebe v. State, 811 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (misdemeanor charge
reversed for failure to abide by statutory notice requirement).
192 Cf U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-66 (1961) (applying exclu-
sionary rule to evidence presented in state court); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-35
(1886) (federal exclusionary rule in criminal and quasi-criminal cases); State v. Simpson, 622
P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1980) (automatic standing under state constitution to challenge search or sei-
zure of stolen property).
193 See ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 69, § 8.
194 Id. art. 69, § 7.
195 See, e.g., Alvarado v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17, 21-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (admitting a
confession obtained in Mexico according to Mexican constitutional standards but not obtained
under processes mandated by United States Constitution).
196 See, e.g., Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); United States v. Portillo-Aguirre,
311 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2002).
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of society as a whole from overbearing or overzealous public authorities, or
from individuals separate from the court who misuse the power given to them
by law. For example, a law officer acting dishonestly may place an entire
court's integrity in question with falsified or perjured evidence, without a judge
or prosecutor ever knowing that its proceedings were dreadfully damaged.
97
Or, at the other extreme, a law officer acting righteously and honestly acting on
no more than an anonymous tip, may catch a criminal or be an instrument of
harassment to an innocent person. 98 Without a shift in priorities from catching
the most horrible offenders to protecting the rights of the innocent, no matter
how guilty and despicable most - or all - of the accused are, the ideal of the
rule of law, with all of its symbolism and potential to do good, is sacrificed to
political expediency.
3. Balancing the Right to Cross-Examination with Witness Rights
to Safety and Security
The ICC Statute provides an admirable mandate to prosecute war
crimes, and more specifically, gender-based crimes. However, without an ade-
quately balanced rule of law that effectively balances basic due process guaran-
tees and the rights of crime survivors, this mandate is weak. 199 The ICC Statute
permits the court to take "appropriate measures" to protect victims and wit-
nesses as long as the measures are not "prejudicial to or inconsistent with the
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.,,200 The statute also states:
Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to
this Statute may lead to the grave endangerment of the security
of a witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the
purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the com-
197 See, e.g., Thomas Korosec, The DA Speaks: Bill Hill Opens Up - A Bit - About Fake-
Drug Scandal and Dallas Police Problems, DALLAS OBSERVER, Mar. 20, 2003 (reporting on Dal-
las County, Texas Prosecutors' scramble to release innocent defendants from criminal justice
system after courts accepted falsified Dallas Police Department investigations sworn to by rogue
police officers and designed to frame innocent people), at http://www.dallasobserver.com/issues/
2003-03-20/news.html/l/index.html. In the United States, of course, police departments and
prosecutors are separate from each other, as well as from the courts, and provide checks on one
another's power.
198 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000) (holding anonymous tip that a person is
carrying a gun, without any corroboration, insufficient cause to justify a police officer's stop
and frisk of that person).
199 See Pieter H.F. Bekker & David Stoelting, The ICC Prosecutor v. President Medema: Simu-
lated Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court, 2 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 1, 19-32
(2002) (moot court debate of ICC Statute among distinguished American attorneys and British
barristers about the use of anonymous witnesses in an international prosecution for rape).
200 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 68, § I.
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mencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information
and instead submit a summary thereof.
20
The statute also allows for the possibility that witness statements may be admit-
ted into evidence without the opportunity for the defense to cross-examine the
202witnesses making the statements.
This language is far from an express guarantee to the defense to know
the identities of the witnesses that provide evidence to the court or to be able to
question his or her accusers. To the contrary, this provision acts as an unfair
advantage for the prosecution. A firm guarantee of the right of cross-
examination is necessary to ensure the rule of law and legitimate prosecution of
all crimes. More appropriate guarantees to protect the rights of uniquely posi-
tioned war crime victims are suggested and discussed in this section.
The precedent available to the court from the ICTY allows for testi-
mony via affidavit 20 3 in what is at best a very weak cross-examination guarantee
for the accused.2° In the first trial of the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadi6,2 °5 the court
firmly ruled that witness identities may be withheld from the defense in order to
protect the witnesses and to create conditions where the possibility of receiving
testimony from witnesses would be more promising.2°6 This is an unbalanced
standard, and not a significant due process guarantee.
The root of this insufficiency is due to a conflict between the two major
legal systems of the world.20 7 This conflict has led to significant differences.
The common law is chaotic compared to the order and predictability of most
civil law regimes. The processes of most civil law regimes look at evidence
through a different legal history and through different thought paradigms, lenses
that do not include the same limitations as most common law jurisdictions.2 °8
201 Id. art. 68, § 5.
202 Id. art 69, § 2 (allowing the court to permit the use of oral, recorded, and written transcripts
as evidence).
203 See Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: The Use of
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 535,
540 (2001).
204 See Leigh, supra note 72, at 236 (arguing that ICTY cross-examination guarantees deny a
defendant the right to a fair trial).
205 105 I.L.R. 420 (ICTY Trial Chamber 1995).
206 Id. at 621.
207 For an overview of the civil and common law systems and their differences, see Fernando
Orrantia, Conceptual Differences Between the Civil Law System and the Common Law System, 19
Sw. U. L. REV. 1161 (1990). For a look at how the two systems come together in international
criminal proceedings, see Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725 (1999).
208 Some civil law regimes have adapted common law practices, creating interesting hybrids.
See, e.g., Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 63, at 409-10 (describing movement in Italy from
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The common law is generally based upon judging every case individually ac-
cording to the rights and unique equities of every situation. On the other hand,
civil law is a more stable system designed to provide a structure in which every
situation may be fairly organized. The typical civil law system does not permit
trial lawyers the art of cross-examination. 209 Civil law is therefore, in this re-
gard, more adaptable to prosecution, particularly prosecution of sexual crimes
because sex war crimes are virtually impossible to enforce without firm proce-
dural mechanisms that protect the survivors of these crimes.21 °
Sometimes the most vulnerable of crime survivors are empowered by
the experience of testifying,2 I but more often they are retraumatized.1 2 This
trauma is commonly expressed by fears for their safety and the safety of their
family or other members of a wider community of which the witness is a mem-
ber.213 The possibility of retaliation is also a significant fear for witnesses in
criminal trials in the United States as it is around the world. The law of the
typical jurisdiction in the United States has protections for child witnesses in
some types of cases,214 and for crime victims, 215 and has law enforcement to
further protect victims of crime. Unlike traditional Westphalian jurisdictions,
inquisitorial model of criminal procedure to more of an adversarial system); Stephen C. Thaman,
Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241 (1998) (trial by jury in
criminal cases in Spain).
209 See Developments, supra note 167, at 2000 n. 13 (explaining how Dutch trial attorney at the
ICTY after a one week crash course in cross-examination hires his British instructor as co-
counsel).
210 See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical Rules: The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on
the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War, 60 ALB. L. REV. 883, 885 (1997). Having personally
worked only within the a common law system, but having prosecuted sexual assault and pedo-
philia cases, and other cases where a powerful person can retaliate against a weaker crime survi-
vor, this author knows firsthand what the effect of such trials can be, and why people do not want
to testify. For a discussion of the effects of trials on child victims, see generally Jessica Liebergott
Hamblen & Murray Levine, The Legal Implications and Emotional Consequences of Sexually
Abused Children Testifying as Victim-Witnesses, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 139 (1997).
211 See Liebergott Hamblen & Levine, supra note 210, at 158 (psychological effects of testify-
ing on crime survivors who are children).
212 Id.
213 See Nora V. Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or
Other Options?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. (Supp.) 641, 644-45 (1998) (discussing the fear of retaliation
in context of organized crime prosecution and family violence prosecution).
214 Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (modifications to formal
courtroom procedures for certain child witnesses, including testifying via pre-recorded video and
closed-circuit television); Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding
that courtroom procedure not enumerated under statute which limited right of confrontation not a
statutory or constitutional violation), with ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 68, § 2 (establishing a
vague standard).
215 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 42.037(i) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (creating crime victim com-
pensation fund, funded by convicted criminals).
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the ICC does not have the capability to protect witnesses. Nonetheless, any
concessions necessary to permit prosecution under these circumstances must
respect the right of an accused person to cross-examine his or her accusers.21 6
Limited concessions in this area are possible because the right to cross-
217
examine witnesses is not absolute, even in the United States. The United
States Supreme Court has allowed limitations of this right when certain exigen-
cies require it. For instance, the Supreme Court has decided that there is no
right of cross-examination upon a confidential informant.1 8 The rationale for
this ruling is that an informant's identity is not relevant or helpful to the defense,
and therefore not essential to a fair determination of a cause. 219 However, if an
American judge doubts the credibility of an informant, he or she may require
that the informant be identified or even produced.220 An informant could clearly
have considerable cause to fear retaliation by the defendant. These rationales
are also relevant internationally; any witness at the ICC who is not essential to a
fair determination of a cause should not be automatically identified for the de-
fense. However, when a witness' identity is relevant or helpful to the defense,
his or her identity must be disclosed, or a case in the United States will be sum-
marily dismissed.22'
Despite this mandate, limited concessions, with a little creativity, can
protect the right of cross-examination while protecting oppressed, isolated and
violated peoples. In Maryland, at least one court has satisfied the Sixth
Amendment cross-examination guarantee by permitting defense counsel access
to a witness while ordering counsel not to disclose the identity of the witness to
his client, his client's relatives, or his client's acquaintances 22  This requires
council to know a defendant's experience as well as a defendant. This is a high
standard but one that should be expected of any defense counsel at the ICC.
Another significant domestic restriction on the right to cross-
examination places limitations on the fight to question children who are crime
victims. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the "[s]tate's interest in
the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be suffi-
ciently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face
216 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
217 See Christine M. Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 75, 76
(1997) (discussing author's victim-centered due process analysis advocated by author of amicus
curie brief to ITCY advocating radically different guarantee than American concept of due process
of law).
218 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305-08 (1967).
219 See id. at 305-10.
220 See id. at 307-08.
221 See id. at 310.
222 See Demleitner, supra note 213, at 646.
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his or her accusers in court., 22 3 This ruling was based, after extensive debate
among American lawyers,224 in part upon the observation that "a significant
majority of States have enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the
trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases .... ,225 In Texas, for example,
children who are victims of certain crimes do not have to directly testify if the
presiding court determines that they are "unavailable" to testify.226 A child
qualifies as "unavailable" when they are physically not there, or when psycho-
logically or emotionally there would be an inappropriate effect on the child if he
or she were to testify. 227 A separate procedure is then required in this situation.
When charges are not yet filed, a specially trained forensic interviewer may
meet with the child in a safe, child-friendly environment and discuss the situa-
tion, on videotape, with the child using objective, non-leading questions. 228 The
defense is then permitted to submit questions for the same forensic interviewer
to ask the child, on videotape. 229 The tape is then shown at trial to the finder of
fact.2
3°
A similar procedure could also be implemented at the ICC. A witness
could be videotaped in a safe environment by a specially trained interviewer.
The defense could be provided with a transcript of the video, redacted as neces-
sary to protect the witness but without taking substantial contextual elements
from the event, and then be provided with the right to submit questions to same
interviewer to ask the witness in the same safe environment. These questions
could be screened by a judge for appropriateness, and then submitted for a sec-
ond interview. The prosecution and the justices would have full access to the
tapes, the transcripts, and the witnesses. The justices would know the limita-
tions placed upon the defense, and could also have the opportunity to question
the witnesses quasi-in-camera through the same process.
Any of these procedures, or a hybrid between them, and a clear rape
shield to prevent any irrelevant analysis of a crime survivor's prior sexual
history,23 could more effectively protect witnesses without unacceptably
removing the right of an accused to cross-examine his or her accusers. The
ICC Statute, as it is currently written, is but a vague assurance and not a
223 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
224 See, e.g., Deborah Clark Weintraub, The Use of Videotaped Testimony of Victims in Cases
Involving Child Sexual Abuse: A Constitutional Dilemma, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1985).
225 Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 (citing numerous states' laws).
226 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38.071 (Supp. Vernon 2003).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., TEX. R. EvID. 412(a) (Texas rape shield law).
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guarantee suitable for a court of law. Reform to this section of the law sim-
ply requires more attention to basic procedure by the statute's drafters.
4. Vagueness and Undefined Terms: The Statute's Definitions of
Crimes
The most controversial offense contemplated in the ICC Statute is "ag-
gression" because of its widely varying interpretation and because the drafters
could not agree on a definition of this term. This term deals with the inappro-
priate use of military force by one actor against another. The statute grants the
court with prospective jurisdiction over "aggression" pending further agreement
as to the definition of aggression and the extent of the court's jurisdiction over
that crime.232 Defining "aggression" is a daunting task because it is very diffi-
cult to create an effective definition of aggression without questioning the le-
gitimate use of military power that stands at the basis of foreign policies of al-
most all of the countries of the world.
The Nuremberg Court had a relatively easy time producing convictions
for this crime because the guilty parties provided the prosecution with a very
clear case to prove. In the time since the vague definition permitted for the fact
scenario prosecuted at Nuremberg, the closest the world has come to creating a
universally acceptable definition of this term was in 1974, when the United Na-
tions created a definition.233 However, this definition was not acceptable to the
diplomats who drafted the ICC Statute. In order for there to be an international
rule of law in which a criminal breach can be alleged, there must a consensus as
to the definitions of offenses. 234 It is unclear how any authoritative, enforceable,
or reasonable definition of this term can be created, except in the context of the
prosecution of the leaders to an uncompromising state pacified by military force.
In general, there are significant problems defining international law of-
fenses, even in the United States.235 In the ICC Statute, aside from the definition
of genocide,236 which is clear, there are many possible interpretations of the
words chosen to define the other crimes and several possible interpretations of
appropriate mens reas applicable to them.237 The statute permits the justices of
232 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, arts. 5, 121,123.
233 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 2319th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974).
234 See Quincy Wright, The Scope of International Criminal Law: A Conceptual Framework,
15 VA. J. INT'L L. 561, 566 (1975).
235 See 18 U.S.C. § 1091-93 (2000) (defining genocide); id. § 2340-2340B (defining torture);
id. § 2441 (defining war crimes).
236 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 6.
237 It is beyond the scope of this Article to look more deeply into the definitions provided in the
statute. However, the fact that these crimes are left open to widely varied interpretations is dis-
concerting because, despite the cautionary terms of the statute, see id. art. 22, § 2, these definitions
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the court to fill in the undefined gaps in the law, including definitions of the
crimes. 238 It has been almost two hundred years since the United States rejected
judicially defined crimes as a part of its canon.239 If a crime is judicially de-
fined, the rule of law has regressed from firm agreements, enforceable by sover-
eigns who are held accountable for their actions, to a Platonian oligarchy 240 of
foreign justices who are not held accountable for their decisions. 24 1 This system
is too far from the jury system in the United States that enforces clearly defined
statutory offenses to stand as a basis for the rule of law.
5. Trial by Jury
Another primary criticism of the ICC Statute is the fact that it conflicts
with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Trial by Jury is an important
check on power because it places power within both a judge and a jury, as
checks and balances against one another, to prevent the integrity of a court's
decision from being lost.24 2 A complete requirement of the Sixth Amendment
provides for "an impartial jury of the State or District wherein the crime was
committed., 243 However, the United States Constitution does not apply to for-
eign crimes committed in foreign jurisdictions. Therefore, unlike a situation
involving an extradition to a foreign country, this conflict only is a problem in
the unlikely event of international prosecution for acts alleged to have taken
place by civilians on United States soil. Unlike the other due process concerns
discussed here, this is a far-fetched possibility. However, this conflict probably
cannot be resolved without either a radical amendment to the United States Con-
stitution or a change in the ICC Statute. The determination of the guilt or inno-
cence of a party accused of a crime by a lay jury is one of the most fundamental
are left to the discretion of the justices of the court. See Smidt, supra note 49, at 210 ("In applying
and interpreting the laws of war, the court will resemble a supralegislature."); see also Rubin,
supra note 49, at 139.
238 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 21, § I(b).
239 See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816) (refusal of executive to prose-
cute common law crimes in order to keep unelected judiciary from defining elements to crimes);
Rubin, supra note 49, at 141 (placing Coolidge in perspective of civil law regimentation of legal
definitions and virtual abandonment of citation to a crime at common law in British legal system).
240 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1973) (360 B.C.E).
241 See Rubin, supra note 49, at 140-4 1.
242 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
243 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 319-24 (1892) (standards of
due process, including right to trial by jury vary from state to state). Compare Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that federal Constitution requires trial by jury for "serious," but
not "petty" offenses), with State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 171 (Me. 1974) (holding that state consti-
tution permits trial by jury for all criminal prosecutions, not just "serious" violations).
[Vol. 106
44
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss2/4
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
tenants of the American justice system.244 Whether or not a constitutional ar-
gument can be made that the right to trial by jury exists before the ICC, this
right cannot be sacrificed domestically to meet foreign ideals in a foreign con-
text.245
6. Double Jeopardy
Article 20 of the ICC Statute provides that the court may not try any
person for conduct that the person has already been convicted or acquitted by
246the ICC, or by another court. However, this same provision creates an excep-
tion for situations in which the Prosecutor determines that the prior court pro-
ceedings were "for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility," or were "not conducted independently and impartially. 247
Without more definitively adequate checks and balances within the court and
beyond the court, the ICC may try an individual that has been fairly tried and
248acquitted by national courts.
The ICC Statute also violates double jeopardy guarantees by allowing
the Prosecutor to appeal its case if the defendant is acquitted at trial.249 Any
prosecution of a specific case should only receive one bite at the apple. 250 The
244 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157-58 (discussing importance of trial by jury and tracing the
practice through American and British history). See generally Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866) (involving habeas corpus rejecting martial law suspension of trial by jury for charges that
included war crimes, and releasing petitioner).
245 See THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 108 (John Jay) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) stating:
[L]et us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our
ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel
them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the
characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character
introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
246 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 20.
247 Id.
248 While a federal court can (and does, on rare occasions) retry a case that was tried in a state
court in the United States, this is one country, acting without international involvement, where the
Constitution has been amended to permit checks and balances on judicial power that runs counter
to the Constitution's federalist basis. As a representative democracy, there is accountability in this
respect that does not exist at the ICC. But see CHRIS CROWE, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: THE
TRUE STORY OF THE EMMETT TILL CASE (2003) (symbolic beginning of Civil Rights Movement;
refusal of federal government to re-prosecute after sham trial of murderers of teenager who was
brutally murdered in famous hate crime). This case is one of the last cases of a very different era.
The entire United States has radically changed since this time. If there is ever anything this outra-
geous again in the United States, the claims of legitimacy and sovereignty asserted in this Article
will be seriously undermined.
249 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 81, § 1.
250 See, e.g., State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 847 (N.H. 1978) (ruling on state constitutional
grounds that prosecutor may not proceed in state court under theory that exact same offense for
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right of the prosecutor to appeal a final conviction is an abrogation of this prin-
ciple that blatantly violates the most basic aspects of the Fifth Amendment to
251the United States Constitution.
IV. DUE PROCESS OF LAW: THE NEED FOR EXPRESS GUARANTEES
AND LIMITS ON JUDICIAL POWER
The ICC statute leaves virtually all due process issues252 up to the jus-
tices in the Pre-trial Chamber to rule upon when an accused person may not
even have an attorney appointed to argue on his or her behalf.2 53 While possible
that the justices of the court could, on their own motions, expand these rights, or
that a defense counsel could appear before the Pre-trial Chamber to present mo-
tions, mere possibilities are not due process guarantees. Moreover, by leaving
basic due process questions unanswered, the statute leaves it up to the discretion
of the justices and the prosecutor to determine the power of the court and the
power of their own roles.
This reliance upon actors in a legal structure to restrict their own power
runs contrary to the concept of having checks and balances in a legal system and
contrary to basic concepts of limited government. The lead drafter of the statute
nonetheless writes, "the concerns of the United States are overstated and that the
interests of the United States in having [an ICC] far outweigh the marginal and
far-fetched concerns that have been articulated by political opponents of the
ICC. ' '254 Due process of law is neither a far-fetched concern nor a political issue
for a country with extensive international responsibilities, numerous actors who
would like nothing more than to attack it at the ICC, and a constitution with
extremely high due process requirements.
On a constitutional level, due process issues must be negotiated within
an international treaty-making process or the United States may not agree to the
treaty. The United States Constitution does not permit international treaties to
abrogate rights guaranteed under the Constitution for actions that fall within
United States jurisdiction.255 Any failure of the United States to carry out an
which defendant was acquitted in federal court was actually a separate offense under concept of
dual sovereignty); see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
251 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
252 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, arts. 66, 67 (presumption of innocence and rights actually
mentioned in the Statute, listed above).
253 Id. art. 56.
254 Conference, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1383, 1403 (1998) (statement from M. Cherif Bassiouni during the conference's convoca-
tion).
255 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (holding that international agreement must be
within the restraints of the Constitution); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924)
(holding that treaty may not authorize unconstitutional action); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
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obligation on constitutional grounds does not relieve the United States of re-
sponsibility under international law. 6 Therefore, constitutional issues must be
addressed in the drafting process.
Even if the scheme arranged under the statute were constitutional, no
matter how high the integrity of the justices or the prosecutor, a formative stat-
ute cannot rely on a holder of power to restrain itself. This is a basic principle in
the American system; there must not be mere confidence that power will not be
abused if left unchecked.257 In order to be viable not just for Americans, but for
everyone, the statute must have a detailed bill of rights that will expressly main-
tain minimum 258 due process guarantees and place limits on the roles of the par-
ties governed by the statute. Any international criminal court statute without a
detailed bill of rights is, on its face, unacceptable.
A written, detailed bill of rights is extremely important in light of the
ICC's ability to expand its jurisdiction beyond genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The ICC Statute does not inherently base its jurisdiction un-
der a concept of universal jurisdiction. 259 However, the Assembly of Member
States could easily influence the court and pressure it to use this doctrine to ex-
pand the court's jurisdiction. The ICTY unnecessarily widened its jurisdiction
on its own, without treaty-based or United Nations Security Council author-
267 (1890) (holding that treaty making power may not permit what is otherwise unconstitutional);
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) (holding that treaty may not change
the Constitution or violate the Constitution); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I I cmt. a (1987) ("[R]ules of international law and
provisions of international agreements of the United States are subject to the Bill of Rights and
other prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements of the Constitution, and cannot be given effect in
violation of them."). But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (holding that international
obligation did not abrogate the First Amendment, but leaving open possibility that a future inter-
national obligation could abrogate the Constitution).
256 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115
cmt. b. ("[Tihe United States remains bound internationally when a principle of international law
or a provision in an agreement of the United States is not given effect because it is inconsistent
with the Constitution .... A state cannot adduce its constitution or its laws as a defense for failure
to carry out its international obligation."); see also id. § 311(3) ("A state may not invoke a viola-
tion of its internal law to vitiate its consent to be bound unless the violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of fundamental importance.").
257 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961) ("[Abuses of power] have generally originated with the men who endeavor to persuade the
people they are the warmest defenders of popular liberty, but who have rarely suffered constitu-
tional obstacles to arrest them in a favorite career." ).
258 See id. NO. 84, at 535 (arguing that a bill of rights is dangerous because it would not be a
constitutional minimum, but rather would limit the powers vested by the Constitution in the peo-
ple). This argument is not applicable in the context of the ICC because there are no constitutional
guarantees to vest authority in the people in international criminal law, and there exists very lim-
ited precedent for the protection of basic rights within international tribunals.
259 ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 12.
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ity.26° The International Court of Justice has taken similar action. 26 1 Whether or
not the policy behind the courts' decisions was good policy or not is irrelevant.
The issue is whether or not activist international judges may assert authority by
these courts where no legislation, treaty, or clear outside written authority per-
mits it.
Similar claims of authority could be made under the ICC Statute be-
cause the statute's terms may easily be expansively interpreted to give the court
jurisdiction over acts not contemplated by the statute. The interpretation and
application of all terms in the statute are left to the discretion of the prosecutor
and the justices, without the checks and balances of a national legislative sys-
tem. This discretion is wide authority to make legal assertions based on un-
tested or imprudent theories into binding decisions that may run counter to
world security and that would not be accepted by reasonable sovereign actors in
a treaty-making proceeding. The ICC could even rule that it has the right to
check the authority of the United Nations.
The court also could look to an unknown, unestablished, or non-existent
custom to support a judgment under an expansive theory of customary interna-
tional law. Customary international law is a loose, non-static, organization of
the general needs of the world. It is supposed to represent basic internationally
262accepted norms. At the close of the Cold War, one scholar described custom-
ary international law as having "a claim to being the most democratic form of
international law, . . . uncircumscribed by a minority of elites"2 63 and, on the
same page of the text, also spoke of opportunities in academia for "refinement
and change of normative content" of the same body of principles from the acad-
emy.264 This statement, although tempered by a call for the restraint of the
"mere projection of personal needs and insecurities ' 265 over perceptions of the
wider "needs, interests, expectations, and forms of participation and interaffecta-
tion ''266 exposes customary international law's raw potential for abuse. Custom-
260 See Prosecutor v. Tadid, 105 I.L.R. 420, 441 (ICTY Trial Chamber 1995), stating:
The Trial Chamber agrees that in [circumstances of serious breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law], the sovereign rights of States cannot and should
not take precedence over the right of the international community to act ap-
propriately as they affect the whole of mankind and shock the conscience of
all nations of the world. There can therefore be no objections to an interna-
tional tribunal properly constituted trying these crimes on behalf of the inter-
national community.
261 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
262 See generally Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 53 (explanation of founda-
tions of customary international law).
263 Id. at 62-63.
264 Id. at 62 n.9.
265 Id.
266 Id.
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ary international law, within the limited scope of its presence within interna-
tional criminal law, has radically evolved since the end of the Cold War. Out-
side of private relationships where market forces are more resistant to raw ma-
nipulations, customary international law runs the risk of derogating into a loose
body of assertions by commentators and politically unaccountable institutions.
Customary international law, in its development from early concepts of
natural law, to positivist norms, into the current movement within international
criminal law towards "custom" by proclamation, has evolved into a loose body
of ideas that can be abused at international criminal proceedings. At its worst, it
resembles little more than a process in which a lawyer or judge selectively gath-
ers scattered examples of behavior or merely scattered statements about behav-
ior, with little comment or challenge, sometimes made only to provide a strate-
gic advantage and not to recognize a policy. 267 The lawyer or judge then draws
links between what he or she has gathered and the policy he or she argues is
proper. This argument is then called the law, at least until another lawyer or
judge draws another set of links to assert another "law." This development is
inconsistent with the American rule of law developed through representative
democracy, separation of powers, federalism, and common law principles.268
Numerous delicate checks and balances intrinsic to the United States ju-
diciary would be non-existent in a court with tunnel vision and an activist
agenda. Sources of law that the court will look to for authority to base an opin-
ion could be no more than a public decree by some professor or international
body. This is unnerving because the ICC Statute paves the way for this action
by leaving even basic questions of jurisdiction unanswered. Activist judges in
preemptive power grabs could use concepts that may have little relevance to
American law.
Arguments that attempt to repudiate challenges to the ICC's broad
claims of authority are couched in assertions that massive cessions of sover-
eignty and domestic jurisdiction are the inevitable consequence of increased
international cooperation and the incontrovertible effect of the ICC Statute.269
An argument based on a mere assertion that a radical shift is incontrovertible or
inevitable is not a strong defense to a fundamental alteration to the most basic
constitutional guarantees of a well-designed, stable legal system that has sur-
vived for centuries.
267 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modem
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640-41 (2000).
268 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 857-67 (1997).
269 See, e.g., Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 337
(1999).
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V. THE DRAFTING PROCESS
The most striking failure of the ICC is the process by which its underly-
ing statute was drafted. This process is the most substantial reason why the
problems previously discussed are so extreme. Professor Cherif Bassiouni, one
of the primary leaders at the drafting convention, has written, "Commentators
on the Rome Statute will surely find much to criticize in the method and tech-
nique (or lack thereof) of the drafters., 270 This is a poignantly broad under-
statement. There was an over-influence of non-state parties in the drafting proc-
ess. Also, before the conference, when the political and diplomatic leadership
of the United States and the American media could have brought a lot of posi-
tive attention to the challenges of drafting a workable statute, the United States
did not seek a leadership role appropriate for a strong country grounded in a
legal system marked by stability and integrity.
According to Professor Bassiouni, the Delegates to the convention were
unprepared and unacquainted with disputed legal issues,271 and the entire con-
vention was designed under a strategy meant to "accelerate the drafting proc-
ess." 272 Professor Bassiouni writes that conference organizers curtailed speech-
making, proposed undebated drafts before negotiations began, and hastily cre-
ated numerous small working groups for specific parts of the treaty in over one
273hundred locations. According to Professor Bassiouni, these locations were
frequently arranged on an ad hoc basis and often changed at the last minute,
without translators for many non-English speakers. Moreover, these locations
were spread out and sometimes difficult to locate, prohibiting delegations from
274participating in the debate about many provisions of the statute.  In the words
of Professor Bassiouni, "[T]he informal working groups accelerated the process,
even though only a few of the 2000 delegates grasped the over all progress of
the work., 275 Professor Bassiouni adds that there was a "disparity in languages,
legal approaches, and drafting techniques" that complicated the drafting process
and that the "piecemeal transmission process" also caused "significant difficul-
ties in maintaining a consistent form and style, in ensuring the uniform usage of
terms, and in providing cross-references to other related articles. 276
As a result, this process was extremely improper, especially for the
creation of a document that could be a significant landmark for generations to
come. A simple contract could not have been drafted under these conditions,
270 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 466.
271 Id. at 446-48.
272 Id. at 448.
273 Id. at 447-51.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 450.
276 Id. at 452.
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much less a complex international statute meant to both affect the most basic
due process rights of people accused of horrendous crimes and to stand as one of
the most significant treaties in world history.277 The convention rushed without
prudent deliberation; it dismissed basic questions of due process of law as pro-
cedural details by leaving them out of the statute entirely, and it ignored treaty-
making proceedings sanctioned by international law. Given these incredible
flaws, it is amazing and commendable that the diplomats at the convention
could come up with a document of any workability. Despite these incredible
flaws, the delegation from the United States and other like-minded delegations
from around the world attempted to work within the structure provided by the
leadership entities at the drafting convention. Nonetheless, judging from the
statute created, the drafters, at best, failed to effectively synthesize the diverse
legal systems of the world, and, at worst, discarded the interests of the United
States and its legal system.
When the United States did not effectively seek a leadership position in
the process of drafting the statute, non-governmental organizations took the
lead. Non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") are institutions that advocate
international policy agendas and monitor state compliance with international
legal rules. NGOs, sanctioned by the U.N. Charter, have an important official
role in international affairs to lobby at the United Nations regarding social and
economic powers; however, they are prohibited from lobbying at the General
Assembly or the Security Council.278 There are no standards to regulate their
conduct, and they are afforded no special rights under international law.279
When invited to sit in at a treaty-making convention, an NGO is no more than a
lobbyist. 280 They are usually focused, single-issue organizations, which take on
277 Unfortunately, some well-meaning professionals view the ICC Statue drafting process as a
model for future treaty negotiations. See, e.g., Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome
Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2
(1999).
278 U.N. CHARTER art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements
for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appro-
priate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations con-
cerned."). There are currently over two thousand NGOs registered with the Economic and Social
Council to lobby at the United Nations. See NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC (Aug. 5,
2003), at http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/pdf/INFList.pdf. For information regarding
the general NGO vision of their more limited role at the United Nations, NGO Global Network, at
http://www.ngo.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
279 See generally Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579
(1999) (calling for formal recognition of roles and responsibilities of NGOs their integration into
system of international regulation).
280 The International Committee of the Red Cross (www.icrc.org) is one of many examples of
stable NGOs that speaks clearly about issues of worldwide importance and takes on challenging
operations to improve the world. Such sanctity, of course, does not give a mere interest group the
right to draft an international treaty any more than it gives a Washington lobbyist the right to draft
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the role of communicating with leaders and mobilizing the public. While it is
important for private institutions to bring attention to issues of worldwide sig-
nificance, 28' nobility of cause has no bearing on the fact that when attending a
treaty-drafting assembly, an NGO is essentially no more than a political interest
group without any sovereign democratic accountability.
The United States cannot sit back while non-state actors take the lead in
282the creation of international institutions. Hundreds of NGOs, such as "No
Peace Without Justice, 2 83 the "World Federalist Movement''284 and the 'Trans-
national Radical Party '285 were active leaders at the conference.286 The "Coali-
tion for the International Criminal Court,2 87 an umbrella organization for over
one thousand NGOs, did a lot more than lobby. It essentially ran the conven-
tion, successfully coordinating an extremely well organized effort to push its
political agendas into the draft.288 Such a structure, being without accountability
domestic legislation. NGOs, as lobbyists, often have political agendas that run counter to estab-
lished legal precedents, such as the abolition of the death penalty or the abolition of gun owner-
ship rights.
281 For example, in writing this Article, I have relied on research conducted by Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch, both NGOs with political agendas that color their reports, but
also establishments with reputations for accurate reporting about policy issues.
282 See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Le-
gitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J INT'L L. 191 (2000) (calling for non-
state entities and self-appointed individuals to pursue the creation of a "Global People's Assem-
bly" through the same process that created the ICC).
283 See http://www.npwj.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
284 See http://www.wfm.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
285 See http://www.radicalparty.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
286 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 455-56.
287 See http://www.iccnow.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
288 The Coalition for the International Criminal Court stated its role as follows:
In order to follow the complex and concurrent negotiations taking place at the
ICC diplomatic conference, thirteen NGO teams have been established. Each
team consists of team leader(s), deputies and interested NGOs. The responsi-
bilities of the Teams include organizing meetings with government delega-
tions and the international CICC and reporting on developments with regards
to articles included in their part of the statute. The teams will also work
closely with the international coalition to recommend actions or strategies to
be adopted on articles included in their part.
Governments interested in holding meetings with a particular team should
contact the team leaders or deputies ....
Coalition for the Int'l Criminal Court, ROME TREATY CONF. MONITOR ON-LINE, June 15, 1998
(periodical specifically published to coordinate non-governmental organization activities related to
the ICC), at http://www.iccnow.org/rome/html/rome-monitor/rmonindex.htm. Since the drafting
of the treaty, this institution has advocated its worldwide ratification.
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to anyone and without the accountability of a domestic legal system, can take
extreme positions and bring adversarial elements and heated rhetoric alien to the
normal character of legal negotiations. This places such institutions in uneven
bargaining positions with states that have extensive domestic and international
responsibilities.
This organizational structure and uneven negotiation process was possi-
ble because the lead drafters allowed the NGOs' leadership unfettered access to
a drafting process in which it was very difficult, except in the central drafting
committee, to determine the statute's precise language. There were frequent
private meetings between the NGOs and key diplomats throughout the conven-
tion, with each viewing the other as indispensable to the promotion of many of
the agendas that have created basic problems in the statute.289 The United States
and like-minded delegations and organizations were frozen out of these closed-
door sessions of politically savvy diplomats and NGO representatives.9 ° Unlike
the overall drafting process, these meetings were well organized and primarily
receptive to small delegations from developing countries.29' United States'
delegates were isolated from primary decision-making processes because they
were not permitted to attend these meetings.292 These meetings included strat-
egy sessions between NGO leaders, the chair of the conference, and other lead-
ers 293 that appear, at best, to have ignored the concerns discussed in this article.
This overtly political drafting atmosphere would be impossible at the United
Nations, where the basic rules strictly limit such behavior.294
Professor Bassiouni hails the "strong professional bonds" of "the dele-
gates of certain active governments and some NGO representatives" as "a sig-
nificant driving force behind the statute. 295 Law professor and former Nurem-
berg Prosecutor Henry King, who joined in this effort, most aptly describes the
situation. In his words, the NGOs "stemmed the tide of U.S. influence and cre-
ated the strongest bulwark against the pressure and alleged threats tendered by
the U.S. delegation and the Pentagon. 296 King continues, "Without this influ-
289 David Davenport, The New Diplomacy, POL'Y REV., Dec. 2002 & Jan. 2003,
http://www.policyreview.org/dec02/davenport.html.
290 Id.
291 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 455.
292 John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court
and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, II PACE INT'L L. REV. 361, 374 (1999).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 372-73.
295 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 455; see Washburn, supra note 292, at 367 (lauding the NGO
participation at the drafting conference for "profoundly influenc[ing] every aspect of the Confer-
ence and deserv[ing] much of the credit for its success").
296 Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward
for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47, 95 (1999).
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ence, it is not at all clear that the delegations at Rome would have reached a
sufficient level of consensus to produce a treaty which would have any force. 297
King draws the conclusion that, "The best testimony to the work done by the
NGOs and the individuals in favor of the court at Rome was their ability to
withstand the final efforts of the United States to influence the outcome of the
conference. 298
This "bulwark" of political pressure isolated the United States' basic
concerns by stifling debate and by rushing one vote on the entire statute with
universal jurisdiction and unchecked power subversive to the structure of the
United Nations. Professor Bassiouni candidly explains the skewed balancing
act that permitted this to happen, stating that in the name of efficiency and the
success of the conference, on the last day of the conference "all of the political
issues," which he lists as "the definition of crimes, the Court's jurisdiction and
triggering mechanisms, complementarity, the roles of the Prosecutor and the
U.N. Security Council, and the prospective application of the Statute's substan-
tive provisions," were presented to be voted on together as a package, without
debate.299
When a vote was called on the ICC Statute, the conference appeared
more like a circus or a late-night infomercial than a body of diplomats from
around the world drafting an important treaty.3°° The appropriate committees
never even reviewed the statute, and the final proposal was not distributed until
the early morning hours of the final day of the convention. 30 1 Before the con-
vention began, the lead drafters did not provide proposed drafts of the treaty to
the countries of the world until shortly before the drafting convention. 30 2 The
chair of the convention purposefully withheld from circulation the draft of the
most sensitive parts of the statute, much of which is dissected in this article,
until it was too late to debate its contents.30 3 The United States had no time for
an interagency review or to consult with its allies.3° Many countries' delegates,
under unreasonable time pressures, supported the statute not even knowing the
language of the final draft or the political ramifications of this language.30 5
297 Id.
298 Id. at 97.
299 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 457-58.
300 U.S. Department of State representative to the drafting conference James Rubin was more
diplomatic, describing it as having the atmosphere of a "festival." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DAILY
PRESS BRIEFING (July 20, 1998), http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9807/980720db.html.
301 Davenport, supra note 289.
302 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 444-45.
303 Id. at 458.
304 Wedgwood, supra note 146, at 200.
305 Davenport, supra note 289; see, e.g., John Bolton, Courting Danger: What's Wrong With
the International Criminal Court, NAT'L INT., Winter 1998/99, at 60, 64 n.8 (arguing that lan-
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Delegations cast their votes often after having little opportunity to pay attention
to even general issues regarding the treaty, much less after being able to debate
or scrutinize the text among themselves.
The consensus-based process of building international law was further
hijacked beyond the requirement that states accept all of the statute or none of it
with the undemocratic requirement that a mere sixty of the world's 189 coun-
307tries would activate the statute. This is less than a third of the total member-
ship of the United Nations. °8 Besides being a radical break from established
international law, this voting process was undemocratic because it ignored the
tiny populations of some countries signing the treaty 3°9 and it imprudently ig-
nored all strategic considerations.
The entire ICC Statute drafting process was a significant break with
centuries of customary international law and a momentous rejection of the un-
derlying principles of understanding and intellectual precision at the basis of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 310 Diplomatic negotiations should
be non-adversarial, and not rushed. This permits the law to evolve according to
the expectations of nations and prevents inflexible political agendas from taking
the color of internationally recognized law.
Despite the political agendas of non-state entities and countries allied
with them, currently no evidence of a conspiracy to write a flawed statute exists.
There was only disarray and confusion, created by well meaning but poorly or-
ganized leadership. The effect of these failings, however, is a two-part fiasco.
The first effect of these failings is a subversive and unrealistic statute, a proce-
dural and linguistic coup d'etat, supported by weak and marginalized entities
able for the first time to speak with loud voices but still with no political respon-
sibility. The second effect is the political isolation of the United States, its
power, and strong legal system. If there is any desire to thwart the influence of
the United Nations or to attack the legitimacy of international treaty-making
guage pertaining to population resettlements in occupied territories in article 8, section (2)(b)(viii)
of the Statute is "an excellent example of the politicization of what is masquerading as a purely
legal process").
306 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 445.
307 See Edward M. Wise, The International Criminal Court: A Budget of Paradoxes, 8 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 261, 268 (2000).
308 Id. at 268-69 (dubbing the term "Half-World Criminal Court" to describe the approval pro-
cedures of the court).
309 For example, small nations such as Andorra (population 66,000), Liechtenstein (population
32,000), San Marino (population 26,000), Nauru (population 11,000), the Marshall Islands (popu-
lation 62,000), Dominica (population 71,000), and Antigua and Barbuda (population 67,000) were
among the first 60 countries to join the court. See COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
STATE SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS CHART, at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigs-
andratifications.html (list of signatories in chronological order); see also NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD 35-36, 70-72, 120 (7th ed. 1999).
310 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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standards, this political agenda should not be brought forward in the form of an
international criminal court. The result of this process is a delegitimized discol-
oration of the law and a weakened court. The drafters over-legislated crimes,
under-legislated processes and procedures, and did not provide a clear enough
definition of the ICC's jurisdiction. In doing so, they superficially reorganized
customary international norms by dislocating them from the international treaty-
making process, from the due process guarantees of the world's strongest de-
mocracies, and from the brutal realities of international affairs.
Outside of the unique history of the European Continent, the over-
legislation of international tribunals has lead to their rejection by sovereign
states, including liberal democracies, and their ultimate irrelevance. For exam-
ple, in the late 1990s, three Commonwealth Caribbean governments denounced
human rights treaties they had agreed to, including treaties that placed their
courts under the jurisdiction of international human rights tribunals.31' These
steps came after a series of rulings by an international body prohibiting
the application of the death penalty on convicted defendants who had used up
their domestic appeals, but who had filed petitions abroad.3t 2 This rejection of
international criminal law in foreign tribunals occurred for many reasons, but
key among these reasons are: over-legalization of the subject matter of the in-
ternational tribunal, conflicting concepts of proper public policy, and the broad
scope of authority within the international tribunal.313 Such rejection has hap-
pened already in the relationship between the United States and the International
Criminal Court, and, although the court will have less of a direct influence on
most of its member states than the Caribbean court did on the former members
of its treaty regime, there could be further severances if there is not reform to the
statute.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Even with appropriate amendments to the ICC Statute, prosecutions by
the ICC must be chosen very carefully lest the court overreach and lose what
limited legitimacy it holds. Potential laboratories where the ICC can develop
legitimacy include Liberia,314 Chad, 315 Sierra Leone, 316 Indonesia, 317 Colum-
311 Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832,
1835-36 (2002).
312 Id. at 1885-94.
313 Id.
314 Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia, has been indicted for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law including the use of child
soldiers in a tribunal in Sierra Leone that, although not created by a treaty, asserts jurisdiction.
See West Africa: Taylor Indictment Advances Justice: Liberian President Must Be Arrested,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 4, 2003, http://hrw.org/press/2003/06/westafrica060403.htm.
315 See Reed Brody, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: The Prosecution
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bia318 and Myanmar (Burma),319 or the prosecution of Osama bin Ladin.32 °
While a prosecution of each of these actors for past violations in each of these
situations would be ex post facto violations, 32 none of them appear to be im-
proving, and future violations may be likely.
Whichever cases the ICC Prosecutor selects for prosecution, the ideals
at the court's basis do not guarantee effective prosecution or deterrence, or even
the potential for the court to have a positive effect on the world. Until the stat-
ute adequately protects the rights of the accused and prevents the ideals at its
basis from being sacrificed to world politics, effective prosecution will escape
the ICC. It is troubling that many American commentators who write intelligent
defenses of the statute do not question the lack of limits on the power of the
of Hissene Habre An "African Pinochet," 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 321 (2000) (discussing torture
and crimes against humanity prosecution in context of study of tribunal in Senegal, that, although
not created by a treaty, asserted jurisdiction).
316 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE'LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE
SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (2002) (describing widespread and systematic use of rape against chil-
dren, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery and other sexual vio-
lence as an instrument of terror during the ten-year civil war in Sierra Leone), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/sierleon0I03.pdf; Stephanie Bald, Searching for a Lost
Childhood: Will the Special Court of Sierra Leone Find Justice for Its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 537 (2002) (describing the use of child soldiers in dangerous missions and heavy combat
in context of court in Sierra Leone); Barbara Crossette, In West Africa, a Grisly Extension of Re-
bel Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at Al (describing armed forces' "campaign of butchery"
against civilians).
317 See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Indonesia: East Timor Trials Deliver Neither Truth Nor
Justice (Aug. 15, 2002), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/indonesia08152002.html (alleg-
ing that prosecutors filed sloppy documents, ignored relevant evidence, failed to protect witnesses
and presented cases which deliberately failed to prove the widespread and systematic nature of the
war crimes that occurred in East Timor).
318 See Campaign Document, Human Rights Watch, Columbia: Justice Denied (Dec. 10, 2002)
(discussing refusal of prosecutors to prosecute paramilitary massacres of civilians), available at
http://hrw.org/campaigns/colombia/justicedenied.pdf.
319 See Andrew Marshall, Amnesty Says Myanmar Using Forced Labor, Torture, July 17, 2002,
at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0717-06.htm; see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963
F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (class action suit with jurisdiction in the United States with allega-
tions of torture, assault, rape, loss of their homes and property, forced labor). Myanmar is the
name for Burma in the Burmese language.
320 The treaty creating the ICC Statute would have to be amended to make large acts of interna-
tional terrorism criminal offenses. However, bin Ladin could be prosecuted for genocide under
the theory that he sought to kill Americans on the basis of their nationality. The primary problem
with allowing the ICC to prosecute Osama bin Ladin is that the ICC does not permit the death
penalty. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 17, art. 77 (listing penalties). There is no such burden in
the United States. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (constitutionality of the death pen-
alty); Jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 647, 766-67 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (unsuccessful challenge
to death penalty under the principles of international law).
321 This assumes that all of these acts occurred before the ICC Statute came into effect over the
parties accused.
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court, or the limits to the rights of the Americans, and anyone else, who could be
brought before it.
322
Professor Benjamin Ferencz, a former Nuremberg Prosecutor from the
United States, has written of the ICC's positive potential, stating "possibilities
for corruption, venality and inefficiency can be found in courts everywhere, but
to suggest that because abuses are imaginable courts should not exist is to doubt
the rule of law itself., 323 Nonetheless, it is equally true that, as James Madison
has written, "Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of
power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of
the full exercise of ... authorit[y]. '324 In this country, the most expansive con-
stitutional amendments that create judicial power were initially designed to pro-
tect the local bases of civil authority325 and have since been shaped to limit gov-
ernmental authority.326 The ICC Statute, while speaking for humanity's most
oppressed, does the opposite for individual rights and local authority. If the
United States submits to this statute as it currently is designed, this country will
risk surrendering the authoritative peacemaking potential it has earned from the
consistent application of the libertarian principles at the core of its constitution.
Professor Bassiouni laments that at the drafting convention, "Many
delegations were dismayed by [the American] display of diplomatic inflexibil-
ity, which was widely interpreted as another sign of U.S. intransigence and as a
weakness in the U.S. negotiating approach. 32 7 He follows this statement with
the observation that "it must be noted that the United States had some valid con-
cerns that were not sufficiently and clearly articulated, and that these were not
addressed in an imaginative fashion., 328 This second observation, as it applies
to the ultimate draft of the statue, is a massive understatement. The United
States has a history of flexibility in its creation of strong legal documents.329
322 See, e.g., A. Diane Holcombe, The United States Becomes a Signatory to the Rome Treaty
Establishing the International Criminal Court: Why Are So Many Concerned by This Action?, 62
MONT. L. REV. 301 (2001).
323 Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 203, 232 (1998).
324 THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 184 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
325 Donald G. Nieman, African Americans and the Meaning of Freedom: Washington County,
Texas as a Case Study, 1865-1886, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 541 (1994) (detailing a case study of
early use by a local population of expanded constitutional rights to achieve a greater measure of
freedom).
326 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing "the fundamental lib-
erty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (protection from government-ordered sterilization); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (limitation on compulsory public education).
327 Bassiouni, supra note 159, at 457.
328 Id.
329 See, e.g., Arvel (Rod) Ponton 111, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST.
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However, in this situation, it must persistently insist upon reform because the
ICC Statute does not adequately support the principles of limited government
and individual rights.
The reform necessary to keep politics out of the courtroom and to pro-
tect due process of law must be made in the form of treaty-based law that has
express limitations on the power the court may claim and must allow for politi-
cal alternatives to prosecution. The statute instead has an over-centralized gov-
erning authority in the Assembly of Member States without limitations on the
power of the court. Any reform that comes from the Assembly of Member
States or from the judges of the court is too easily reversed, gives credibility to
the sections of the statute that are not reformed, and takes the treaty-making
power away from sovereign countries and gives it to an unaccountable interna-
tional body.
Furthermore, the statute appears to be based on the premise that prose-
cution within an undeveloped area of the law is always the ultimate end of peace
and reconciliation. International prosecution neither guarantees justice nor nec-
essarily solves problems.33° In some desperate regions, where populations need
to rebuild after war, the tearing of internal wounds prevents this process, or a
population merely needs peace after years of unspeakable horrors or simply the
existence of a basic civilized order more than even a symbol of justice.33'
A strong statute must look beyond the good intentions of most of the
current statute's supporters.332 The statute as it is currently written hurts the
long-term international stability it seeks by placing inadequate checks and bal-
ances on the power it claims. This inadequacy attacks the accountability that
comes from sovereignty and decentralized government and replaces it with
standards based in mere rhetoric and undefined passages of law that risk making
the court irrelevant to world affairs.333 Even if there were stronger checks and
MARY'S L.J. 93 (1988) (discussing the fusion of Jacksonian democracy, Spanish civil law, the
American Revolution, constitutions of different states of the United States, English common law
and the rejection of the lack of basic due process guarantees allowed under prior dictatorial rule
into the Texas Constitution and the formation of the Republic of Texas).
330 See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998) (discuss-
ing thesis that war crime tribunals provide little more than a symbol of justice after incalculable
horrors).
331 See W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public
Order, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 175, 175 (1995) (arguing that we not "fall victim to a judicial
romanticism in which we imagine that merely by creating entities we call 'courts' we have solved
major problems"); see also Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth
Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 398 (1997) (arguing that the ICC needs reform
because it provides no discretion for truth commissions and other methods of reconciliation that
may be more appropriate than criminal prosecution in individual circumstances).
332 See Wise, supra note 307, at 268-72 (supplying an interesting analysis of the ICC Statute
that cautions that the ICC faces many paradoxes and dangers within the well-meaning efforts to
establish a universal system of justice).
333 See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J INT'L L. I
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balances within the statute, the court's undefined jurisdiction and its expectation
that written words alone will deter the skewed values of the terrorists and other
lawless butchers of the world, both risk placing fear of prosecution only into
states trying to bring peace and security to the world.334
Lest the twenty-first century be bloodier than the twentieth, an appro-
priate symbol of the rule of law and model legal system must be a workable
reality. Like the United States Constitution, the ICC Statute must be meticu-
lously designed to protect individual rights and to protect the reasonable use of
preventative force. The statute, in its current form, reads like a European vision
of a world without American power, without American constitutional guaran-
tees, and without a basis in the lessons learned from victories in the Cold War
and the second World War.335 This statute is a unilateral rejection of the Ameri-
can backbone to world security and a tool to promote an over-centralized global
order. The ICC must instead be a fully worldwide body with clearly enumerated
powers if it is to secure a strong and positive role in world affairs.
The possibilities for secure peace and meaningful justice today require
international institutions to speak with authority and fairness. These possibili-
ties remain as they did before September 11, as they did in 1945, 1648, 1776
and 1989. They continue to demand international cooperation and open dia-
logue. Cooperation and open dialogue will be difficult if the ICC is subversive
to the United Nations' attempts to maintain political stability, or to the many
responsibilities the United States has around the world. In order to reach the
goals and ideals of this institution, including a successful international fight
against terrorism, the signatory countries to the ICC Statute must be willing to
enter into dialogue about reform to the statute, and the United States must be a
role model and an active participant in this process.
(2000) (detailing failings of legal assertions to prevent moral action in international affairs).
334 Issues relating to the relationship of American military force and the power claimed by the
ICC go far beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Smidt, supra note 49 (discussing the
relationship between the use of judicial authority to punish parties who commit atrocities and the
use of military force to prevent atrocities).
335 See generally James W. Caesar, A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism, PUB. INT., Summer
2003 (arguing that contemporary European thinkers must seek common ground with American
thought, and must reject lazy, amorphous anti-American arguments, while Americans must be
more open to outside criticism and must not reject legitimate criticism as raw anti-Americanism,
presented as thesis within article that traces history of Anti-Americanism in European thought and
its effect on the world).
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